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A DICKENSIAN ERA OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS: AN UPDATE ON
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

JOHN WrTIE, JR.*
I. DICKENSIAN PARADOXES
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the
age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of
belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light,
it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was
the winter of despair .... '
Charles Dickens penned these famous words to describe the
paradoxes of the late eighteenth-century French Revolution fought
for the sake of "the rights of man and citizen."2 These same words
aptly describe the paradoxes of the late twentieth-century world
revolution fought in the name ofhuman rights and democratization

for all.
The world has entered something of a "Dickensian era"3 in the
past two decades. We have seen the best of human rights
protections inscribed on the books, but some of the worst of human
* Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law and Ethics; Director of Law and Religion Program,
Emory University. BA Calvin College (1982); J.D. Harvard Law School (1985). This Essay
builds on a lecture delivered at the Krc Institute, University of Notre Dame, in April 1998
at a conference on The Sacred, The Sword, and Global Security," convened by Professor
Scott Appleby. It updates some of the themes of RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE, VOL. 1: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES; VOL. II: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (John Witte,
Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS I and
RELIGIOUS HUMANRIGHTS III, and myLaw, Religion, andHuman Rights, 28 COL. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 1 (1996). I would like to express my thanks to Abdullahi An-Na'im, Scott Appleby,
Michael Broyde, Dave Douglas, Jeremy Gunn, Marci Hamilton, Joan Lockwood O'Donovan,
Dinah Shelton, and Johan van der Vyver for their helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this
essay.
1. CHARLES DIcKENS, A TALE OF Two CTIEs 1 (1859).
2. Declarationdes droitsde l'homme et du citoyen [Declarationofthe Rightsof Man and
ofCitizen] (1791), in LONDUGU1T, LES CONSTITUTIONS LTLES PRINCIPALES LOIS POLTIQUES
DE LA FRANcE DEPUIS 1789 1 (7th ed., 1952).
3. The phrase is from Irwin Cotler, Jewish NGOs andReligiousHumanRights: A Case
Study, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN JUDAISM: CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, AND PoITicAL PERSPECTIVES
165 (Michael J. Broyde & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1998) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN
JUDAISM].
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rights violations inflicted on the ground. We have celebrated the
creation of more than thirty new constitutional democracies since
1980, but lamented the eruption of more than thirty new civil wars.
We have witnessed the wisest of democratic statecraft and the most
foolish of autocratic belligerence. For every South African "spring
of hope," there has been a Yugoslavian "winter of despair."
These Dickensian paradoxes of the modern human rights
revolution are particularly striking when viewed in their religious
dimensions. On the one hand, the modern human rights revolution
has helped to catalyze a great awakening of religion around the
globe. In regions newly committed to democracy and human rights,
ancient faiths once driven underground by autocratic oppressors
have sprung forth with new vigor. In the former Soviet bloc, for
example, numerous faiths such as Buddhism, Christianity,
Hinduism, Judaism, and Islam have been awakened alongside a
host of exotic goddess, naturalist, and personality cults.4 In
postcolonial and postrevolutionary Africa, these same mainline
religious groups have come to flourish in numerous conventional
and inculturated forms alongside a bewildering array of traditional
groups.5 In Latin America, the human rights revolution has not only
transformed longstanding Catholic and mainline Protestant
communities, but also triggered the explosion of numerous new
Evangelical, Pentecostal, and traditional movements.6 Many parts
of the world have seen the prodigious rise of a host of new or newly
minted faiths, including Adventists, Bahi'as, Hare Krishnas,
Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Scientologists, and Unification
Church members, among others-some wielding ample material,
political, and media power. Religion today has become, in Susanne
Rudolph's apt phrase, the latest "transnational variable."7

4. See PROSELYTISMAND ORTHODOXYINRuSSIA: THENEWWARFORSOuLs (John Witte,
Jr. & Michael Bourdeaux eds., 1999) [hereinafter PROSELYtiSM AND ORTHODOXY].
5. See HUMANRIGHTSINAFRICA CROSS-CuLTURALPERSPECTIVES (Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990); PROSELYTIZATION AND COMMUNAL SELFDETERMINATIONINAFRICA (Abdullahi AhmedAn-Na'im ed., 1999); Symposium: The Problem
of Proselytismin Southern Africa, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 491-1303 (2000).
6. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EVANGELIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE CHALLENGE
OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 1999).
7. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Introduction to TRANSNATIONAL RELIGION AND FADING
STATES 6 (Susanne Hoeber Rudolph & James Piscatori eds., 1997).
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One cause and consequence of this great awakening of religion
around the globe is that the ambit of religious rights has been
substantially expanded. In the past two decades, more than 150
major new statutes and constitutional provisions on religious rights
have been promulgated-many replete with generous protections
for liberty of conscience and freedom of religious exercise,
guarantees of religious pluralism, equality, and nondiscrimination,
and several other special protections and entitlements for religious
individuals and religious groups.8 These national guarantees have
been matched with a growing body of regional and international
norms, notably the 1981 UN Declarationon Religious Intolerance
and DiscriminationBased Upon Religion and Belief and the long
catalogue of religious-group rights set out in the 1989 Vienna
ConcludingDocument and its progeny. 9
On the other hand, this very same world human rights revolution
has helped to catalyze new forms of religious and ethnic conflict,
oppression, and belligerence that have reached tragic proportions.
In some communities, such as the former Yugoslavia, local religious
and ethnic rivals, previously kept at bay by a common oppressor,
have converted their new liberties into licenses to renew ancient
hostilities, with catastrophic results." In other communities, such
as Sudan and Rwanda, ethnic nationalism and religious extremism
have conspired to bring violent dislocation or death to hundreds
of rival religious believers each year, and persecution, false
imprisonment, forced starvation, and savage abuses to thousands
of others.1" In other communities, most notably in North America
and Western Europe, political secularism and nationalism have
8. For a good sampling of international and local legal documents on religious liberty,
see NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, BELIEF, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 129-47 (2000);

RELIGIONANDHUMANRIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS (Tad Stahnke &J. Paul Martin eds., 1998)
[hereinafter RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS].
9. For analysis, see KEVINBOYLE &JULIET SHEEN, FREEDOM OFRELIGIONAND BELIEF:
AWORLD REPORT (1997); MALCOIiD. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LiBERTYAND INTERNATIONAL LAW

IN EUROPE (1997); BAHmYIN G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF. ENSURING
EFFECTIvE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION (1996); RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS I, supra
note *; RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS 1, supra note *.

10. See JULIE A. MERTUS, KOSOVO: HOWMYTHSANDTRuTHs STARTEDAWAR (1999); PAUL

MOJzEs, YUGOSLAVIAN INFERNO: ETHNoRELIGIOUS WARFARE IN THE BALKANS (1995);
MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE BETRAYED: RELIGION AND GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA (1996).
11. See FRANCIS M. DENG, WAR OFVISIONS: CONFLICT OF IDENTITIES IN THE SUDAN 9-31

(1995).
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combined to threaten a sort of civil denial and death to a number
of believers, particularly "sects" and "cults" of high religious
temperature or of low cultural conformity.'2 In still other
communities, from Asia to the Middle East, Christians, Jews, and
Muslims, when in minority contexts, have faced sharply
increased
3
restrictions, repression, and, sometimes, martyrdom.'
In parts of Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America,
this human rights revolution has brought on something of a new
war for souls between indigenous and foreign religious groups. This
is the most recent, and the most ironic, chapter in the modern
Dickensian drama. With the political transformations of these
regions in the past two decades, foreign religious groups were
granted rights to enter these regions for the first time in decades.
In the early 1990s, they came in increasing numbers to preach their
faiths, to offer their services, and to convert new souls. Initially,
local religious groups-Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Sunni,
Shi'ite, and traditional alike-welcomed these foreigners,
particularly their foreign co-religionists with whom they had lost
contact for many decades. Today, local religious groups have come
to resent these foreign religions, particularly those from North
America and Western Europe that assume a democratic human
rights ethic. Local religious groups resent the participation in the
marketplace ofreligious ideas that democracy assumes. They resent
the toxic waves of materialism and individualism that democracy
inflicts. They resent the massive expansion of religious pluralism
that democracy encourages. They resent the extravagant forms of
religious speech, press, and assembly that democracy protects.'4
12. A whole battery ofnew state reports on sects and cults recently emerged in Germany,
France, Belgium, and Austria, some with a tone approaching xenophobia. The most
comprehensive is the Endbericht der Enquete-Kommission Sogennante Sekten und
Psychogruppen,Deutscher Bundestag 13. Wailperiode Drucksche 13/10950 (June 6,1998).
See also ELIZABETH ARWEK & PETER B. CLARKE, NEw RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN
EUROPE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIoGRAPHY (1997); NEW RELIGIONS AND NEW RELIGIOSITY (E.
Braker & M. Warburg eds., 1998); NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE (H. Meldgaard
& J. Aagaard eds., 1997); Jonathan Luxmoore & Jolanta Babiuch-Luxmoore, New Myths for
Old: Proselytism and Transition in Post-Communist Europe, 36 J. ECUMENIcAL STUD. 43

(1999).
13. See Report of the U.S. Commission on InternationalReligious Freedom 1-80 (May 1,
2000); United States Commission on Religious Freedom, Staff Memorandum for the
Chairman:Religious Freedom in Sudan, China, and Russia 1-158 (May 1, 2000).
14. See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text; see also Symposium, Pluralism,
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A new war for souls has thus broken out in these regions, a war
to reclaim the traditional cultural and moral souls of these new
societies, and a war to retain adherence and adherents to the
indigenous faiths. 5 In part, this is a theological war: rival religious
communities have begun to demonize and defame each other and to
gather themselves into ever more dogmatic and fundamentalist
stands. The ecumenical spirit of the previous decades is giving way
to sharp new forms ofreligious balkanization. In part, this is a legal
war: local religious groups have begun to conspire with their
political leaders to adopt statutes and regulations restricting the
constitutional rights of their foreign religious rivals. 6 Beneath
shiny constitutional veneers of religious freedom for all and
unqualified ratification of international human rights instruments,
several countries of late passed firm new antiproselytism laws, cult
registration requirements, tightened visa controls, and adopted
various other discriminatory restrictions on new or newly arrived
religions.17

Such Dickensian paradoxes have exposed the limitations of a
secular human rights paradigm standing alone. They also have
inspired the earnest search for additional resources to deter
violence, resolve disputes, cultivate peace, and ensure security
through dialogue, liturgical healing, reconciliation ceremonies,
truth commissions and other means.' 8 Human rights principles are
as much the problem as they are the solution in a number of
current religious and cultural conflicts. In the war for souls in
Russia, for example, two absolute principles of human rights have
come into direct conflict: The foreign religion's free exercise right to
share and expand its faith versus the indigenous religion's libertyProselytismand Nationalismin EasternEurope, 36 J.ECUMENIcAL STuD. 1 (1999).
15. See, e.g., PROSELYTISM AND ORTHoDOXY, supranote 4.
16. See RELIGIOUs HuMAN RIGMS II, supranote *.
17. See, e.g., id at 305.
18. See R. SCOTTAPPLEBY, THE AMBIVALENCE OFTHE SACRED: RELIGION, VIOLENCE, AND
RECONCILIATION 167-308 (2000); WOLFGANG HUBER & HANS-RICHARD REUTER,
FRIEDENSEHIK209-352 (1990); RELIGION: THEMISSINGDIhVENSIONOF STATECRAFt (Douglas

Johnston & Cynthia Sampson eds., 1994); Donald W. Shriver, Jr., Religion and Violence
Prevention,in CASESAND STRATEGIES FORPREVENTIVEACTION 169,178-95 (Barnett R. Rubin
ed., 1998); Donald W. Shriver, Jr., The Taming of Mars: Can Humans of the Twenty-First
Century ContainTheirPropensityfor Violence and Globalization,in GOD, RELIGIONAND THE
POWERS OFTHE COMON LIFE 140,148-61 (Max L. Stackhouse & Peter J. Paris eds., 2000).
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of-conscience right to be left alone in its own territory. 9 Or, put in
Christian theological terms, it is one group's right to abide by the
Great Commission ("Go ye therefore, and make disciples of all
nations"), versus another group's right to insist on the Golden Rule
("Do unto others as you would have done unto you."). 2 Further
rights talk alone cannot resolve this dispute. Likewise, some of the
nations given to the most belligerent forms of religious nationalism
have ratified more of the international human rights instruments
than the United States has and have crafted more elaborate bills of
rights than what appears in the United States Constitution.2 ' Here,
also, further rights-talk alone is insufficient.
These paradoxes of the modern human rights revolution
underscore an elementary but essential point that human rights
norms need a human rights culture to be effective. "[Dleclarations
are not deeds," John Noonan reminds us: "a form of words by itself
secures nothing... words pregnant with meaning in one cultural
context may be entirely barren in another." 22 Human rights norms
have little salience in societies that lack constitutional processes
that will give them meaning and measure. They have little value for
parties who lack basic rights to security, succor, and sanctuary, or
who are deprived of basic freedoms of speech, press, or association.
They have little pertinence for victims who lack standing in courts
and other basic procedural rights to pursue apt remedies. They
have little cogency in communities that lack the ethos and ethic to
render human rights violations a source of shame and regret,
restraint and respect, confession and responsibility, reconciliation
and restitution. As we have moved from the first generation of
19. See generally Symposium, Soul Wars: The Problem of Proselytism in Russia, 12
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1-738 (1998).

20. See Matthew 28:19-20, 7:12; Mark 16:15-18; Acts 1:8. For variant analyses of these
texts, see SHARING THE BOoi RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF
PROSELYTISM (John Witte, Jr. & Richard C. Martin eds., 1999) [hereinafter SHARING THE
BOOK].

21. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995); Johan D. van der Vyver, Universality and
Relativism of Human Rights: American Relativism, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 43, 43-45
(1998).
22. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Tensions and the Ideals, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS II,
supranote *,at 593, 594; see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 265-84 (1998) [hereinafter NOONAN, LUSTRE

OF OUR COUNTRY].
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human rights declaration following World War II to the current
generation of human rights implementation, this need for a human
rights culture has become all the more pressing.
These paradoxes, when viewed in their religious dimensions,
further suggest that religion and human rights need to be brought
into a closer symbiosis.
On the one hand, human rights norms need religious narratives
to ground them. There is, of course, some value in simply declaring
human rights norms of "liberty, equality, and fraternity" or "life,
liberty, and property"-if for no other reason than to pose an ideal
against which a person or community might measure itself, to
preserve a normative totem for later generations to make real. But,
ultimately, these abstract human rights ideals of the good life and
the good society depend on the visions and values of human
communities and institutions to give them content and
coherence-to provide what Jacques Maritain once called"the scale
of values governing [their] exercise and concrete manifestation."'
It is here that religion must play a vital role. Religion is an
ineradicable condition of human lives and human communities.
Religions invariably provide many of the sources and "scales of
values" by which many persons and communities govern
themselves. Religions inevitably help to define the meanings and
measures of shame and regret, restraint and respect, responsibility
and restitution that a human rights regime presupposes. Religions
must thus be seen as indispensable allies in the modern struggle for
human rights. To exclude them from the struggle is impossible,
indeed catastrophic. To include them, by enlisting their unique
resources and protecting their unique rights, is vital to enhancing
the regime of human rights and to easing some of the worst
paradoxes that currently exist.
Conversely, religious narratives need human rights norms both
to protect them and to challenge them. There is, of course, some
value in religions simply accepting the current protections of a
human rights regime-the guarantees of liberty of conscience, free
exercise, religious group autonomy, and the like. But passive
acquiescence in a secular scheme of human rights ultimately will
23. Jacques Maritain, Introduction to UNESCO, HUmIAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND
INTERPRETATIONS VII (1948).
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not prove effective. Religious communities must reclaim their own
voices within the secular human rights dialogue, and reclaim the
human rights voices within their own internal religious dialogues.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the theory and law of human
rights are neither new nor secular in origin. Human rights are, in
no small part, the modern political fruits of ancient religious beliefs
and practices-ancient Jewish constructions of covenant and
mitzvot; original Qur'anic texts on peace and the common good;
classic Christian concepts of ius and libertas,freedom and law.26
Religious communities must be open to a new human rights
hermeneutic-fresh methods of interpreting their sacred texts and
traditions that will allow them to reclaim their essential roots and
roles in the cultivation ofhuman rights. Religious traditions cannot
allow secular human rights norms to be imposed on them from
without: they must rediscover them from within. It is only then that
religious traditions can bring their full doctrinal rigor, liturgical
healing, and moral suasion to bear on the problems and paradoxes
of the modern human rights regime.
Both these theses (concerning the place of religion in human
rights and the place of human rights in religion) are highly
controversial. In the next two sections, I shall try to parse these
controversies and press these theses a bit more concretely. The final
section will wrestle with a few of the difficult theological and legal
conundrums that are raised by a closer symbiosis between religion
and human rights.
II. RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
My first response to our modern Dickensian paradoxes is that
religion, in all of its denominational multiplicity, must play a more
active role in the modern human rights revolution. Many would
consider this thesis to be fundamentally misguidedY Even the
24. See David Novak, Religious Human Rights in Judaic Texts, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
JUDAISM, supra note 3.
25. See ABDULLAIii AIMD AN-NA'IM, TowARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL
LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-10 (1990); ANN ELIZABETH MAYER,
ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 46-68 (2d ed., 1995).
26. See RELIGIOUSLIBERTYINWESTERNTHOUGHT(NoelB. Reynolds &W. Cole Durham,
Jr. eds., 1996).
27. This section is a summary of the argument set out in the sources listed in supra
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great religions of the Book do not speak unequivocally about human
rights, and none has amassed an exemplary human rights record
over the centuries. Their sacred texts and canons say much more
about commandments and obligations than about liberties and
rights. Their theologians and jurists have resisted the importation
of human rights as much as they have helped cultivate them. Their
internal policies and external advocacy have helped to perpetuate
bigotry, chauvinism, and violence as much as they have served to
propagate equality, liberty, and fraternity. The blood of thousands
is at the doors of our churches, temples, and mosques. The
bludgeons of pogroms, crusades, jihads, inquisitions, and ostracisms
have been used to devastating effect within and among these faiths.
Moreover, the modern cultivation of human rights in the West
began in the 1940s when both Christianity and the Enlightenment
seemed incapable of delivering on their promises. In the middle of
this century, there was no second coming of Christ promised by
Christians, no heavenly city of reason promised by enlightened
libertarians, no withering away of the state promised by
enlightened socialists. Instead, there was world war, gulags, and
the Holocaust-a vile and evil fascism and irrationalism to which
Christianity and the Enlightenment seemed to have no cogent
response or effective deterrent.
The modern human rights movement was thus born of
desperation in the aftermath of World War II. It was an attempt to
find a world faith to fill a spiritual void. It was an attempt to
harvest from the traditions of Christianity and the Enlightenment
the rudimentary elements of a new faith and a new law that would
unite a badly broken world order. The proud claims of Article I of
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights---All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights [and] ... are
endowed with reason and conscience-expounded the primitive
truths of Christianity and the Enlightenment with little basis in
post-War world reality. Freedom and equality were hard to find
anywhere. Reason and conscience had just blatantly betrayed
themselves in the gulags, battlefields, and death camps.

note *.
28. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. (1948), reprintedin RELIGION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, supranote 8, at 57 [hereinafter 1948 Universal Declaration].
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Though desperate in origin, the human rights movement grew
precociously in the decades following World War II. The United
Nations issued a number of landmark documents on human rights
in the 1960s. Foremost among these were the two great
international covenants promulgated by the United Nations in
1966. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (1966) posed as essential to human dignity the
rights to self-determination, subsistence, work, welfare, security,
education, and various other forms of participation in cultural life.29
The InternationalCovenanton Civil and PoliticalRights (1966) set
out a long catalogue of rights to life; security of person and
property; freedom from slavery and cruelty; basic civil and criminal
procedural protections; rights to travel and pilgrimage; freedoms of
religion, expression, and assembly; rights to marriage and family
life; and freedom from discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex,
language, and national origin. 0 Other international and domestic
instruments issued in the later 1960s took particular aim at racial,
religious, and gender discrimination in education, employment,
social welfare programs, and other forms and forums of public life.3 1
Various nations pressed their own human rights movements. In
America, the rights revolution yielded a powerful grassroots Civil
Rights Movement and a welter of landmark cases and statutes
implementing the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment. In
Africa and Latin America, it produced agitation, and eventually
revolt, against colonial and autocratic rule. Academics throughout
the world produced a prodigious new literature urging constant
reform and expansion of the human rights regime. Within a
generation, human rights had become the "new civic faith" of the
post-War world order.3 2
Christian and Jewish communities participated actively as
midwives in the birth of this modern rights revolution, and special
religious rights protections were at first actively pursued.
29. See G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess. (1966), reprinted in RELIGION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 8, at 61.
30. See id., reprintedin RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 8, at 69.
31. For a detailed analysis of the international community's approach to religious human
rights, see LERNER, supranote 8, at 9-39; Natan Lerner, ReligiousHuman Rights Underthe
UnitedNations, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS II, supranote *, at 79.
32. See JACQUES MARrrAIN, MANAND THE STATE, 110-11 (1951); see also U.N. CHARTER
preamble (declaring a "faith in fundamental human rights").
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Individual religious groups issued bold confessional statements and
manifestoes on human rights shortly after World War II. Several
denominations and budding ecumenical bodies joined Jewish NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in cultivating of human rights
at the international level."3 The Free Church tradition played a
critical role in the Civil Rights Movement in America and beyond,
as did the Social Gospel and Christian Democratic Party movements in Europe and Latin America."'
After expressing some initial interest, however, leaders of the
rights revolution consigned religious groups and their particular
religious rights to a low priority. Freedom of speech and press,
parity of race and gender, and the provision of work and welfare
captured most of the energy and emoluments of the rights
revolution. After the 1960s, academic inquiries and activist
interventions into religious rights and their abuses became
increasingly intermittent and isolated, inspired as much by
parochial self-interest as by universal golden rules. The rights
revolution seemed to be passing religion by.
This deprecation of the special roles and rights of religions from
the later 1960s onward introduced several distortions into the
theory and law of human rights in vogue today.
First, without religion, many rights are cut from their roots. The
right to religion, Georg Jellinek once wrote, is "the mother of many
other rights."35 For the religious individual, the right to believe
leads ineluctably to the rights to assemble, speak, worship,
proselytize, educate, parent, travel, or to abstain from the same on
the basis of one's beliefs. For the religious association, the right to
exist invariably involves rights to corporate property, collective
worship, organized charity, parochial education, freedom of press,
and autonomy of governance. To ignore religious rights is to
overlook the conceptual, if not historical, source of many other
individual and associational rights.

33. See Cotder, supranote 3, at 177-87.
34. See J. Bryan Hehir, Religious Activism for Human Rights: A ChristianCase Study,
in RELIGIOUS HUMIAN RIGHTS I, supra note *, at 97, 107-17; ROBERT TRAER, FAIH AND
HUmAN RIGHTS 23-28 (1994).
35. GEORGJELLINEKDIEERKLIRUNGDERMENSCHEN-UNDBORGERRECHTE: EINBEITRAG
ZUR MIODERNEN VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE 42 (1895).
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Second, without religion, the regime of human rights becomes
infinitely expandable. The classic faiths of the Book adopt and
advocate human rights to protect religious duties. A religious
individual or association has rights to exist and act not in the
abstract, but in order to discharge discrete religious duties.3 6
Religious rights provide the best example of the organic linkage
between rights and duties. Without them, rights become abstract,
with no obvious limit on their exercise or expansion.
Third, without religion, human rights become too captive to
western libertarian ideals. Many religious traditions-whether of
Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, Islamic, Taoist, Orthodox, Reformed,
or traditional stock-cannot conceive of, nor accept, a system of
rights that excludes religion. Religion is, for these traditions,
inextricably integrated into every facet of life. Religious rights are,
for them, an inherent part of rights of speech, press, assembly, and
other individual rights, as well as ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and
similar associational rights. No system of rights that ignores or
deprecates this cardinal place of religion can be respected or
adopted.
Fourth, without religion, the state is given an exaggerated role
to play as the guarantor of human rights. The simple state versus
individual dialectic of many modern human rights theories leaves
it to the state to protect and provide rights of all sorts. In reality,
the state is not (and cannot be) so omnicompetent. Numerous
"mediating structures" stand between the state and the individual,
religious institutions prominently among them.3" Religious
institutions, among others, play a vital role in the cultivation and
realization of rights. They can create the conditions (sometimes the
prototypes) for the realization of first generation civil and political
rights. They can provide a critical (sometimes the principal) means
to meet second-generation rights of education, health care, child
care, labor organizations, employment and artistic opportunities,
36. See AN-NA'IM, supranote 25, at 1-10; DAVID NOVAK, COVENANTAL RIGHTS: A STUDY
INJEWISHPOLITIcALTHEoRY3-12 (2000); 1-3 WORLD COUNcILOP CHURCHES, HUMANRIGHTS
AND CHRISTIAN RESPONSIBILITY (1975). For detailed analysis, see WOLFGANG HUBER AND
HEINZ EDUARDTODT, MENSCHENREcHTE: PERSPEKTIEN EINERMENSCHLICHEN WELT (1977);
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61-79 (Sumner B. Twiss & John Kelsay eds., 1996).
37. For various arguments in favor of social pluralism, see POLITICAL ORDER AND THE
PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY (James W. Skillen & Rockne M. McCarthy eds., 1991);
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
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among others. They can offer some of the deepest insights into
norms of creation, stewardship, and servanthood that lie at the
heart of third generation rights.
The challenge of the next century will be to transform religious
communities from midwives to mothers of human rights-from
agents that assist in the birth of rights norms conceived elsewhere,
to associations that give birth to and nurture their own unique
contributions to human rights norms and practices.
The ancient teachings and practices ofJudaism, Christianity, and
Islam have much to commend themselves to the human rights
regime. Each of these traditions is a religion of revelation, founded
on the eternal command to love one God, oneself, and all neighbors.
Each tradition recognizes a canonical text as its highest
authority-the Torah, the Bible, and the Qur'an, respectively. Each
tradition designates a class of officials to preserve and propagate its
faith, and embraces an expanding body of authoritative
interpretations and applications of its canons. Each tradition has
a refined legal structure-the Halacha, the canon law, and the
Shari'a-that has translated its enduring principles of faith into
evolving precepts of works. Each tradition has sought to imbue its
religious, ethical, and legal norms into the daily lives of individuals
and communities. Each tradition has produced a number of the
basic building blocks of a comprehensive theory and law of religious
rights-conscience, dignity, reason, liberty, equality, tolerance,
love, openness, responsibility, justice, mercy, righteousness,
accountability, covenant, and community, among other cardinal
concepts. Each tradition has developed its own internal system of
legal procedures and structures for the protection of rights, which
historically have and still can serve as both prototypes and
complements for secular legal systems. Each tradition has its own
advocates and prophets, ancient and modern, who have worked to
achieve a closer approximation of human rights ideals. "
III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGION
This leads to my second response to the Dickensian paradoxes of
our modern human rights revolution: human rights must have a
38. This is the central thesis of RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS I, supra note *.
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more prominent place in the theological discourse of modern
religions. Many would consider this second thesis to be as
misguided as the first. It is one thing for religious bodies to accept
the freedom and autonomy that a human rights regime allows. This
at least gives them unencumbered space to pursue their divine
callings. It is quite another thing for religious bodies to import
human rights into their own polities and theologies. This exposes
them to all manner of unseemly challenges.
Human rights norms, religious skeptics argue, challenge the
structure of religious bodies. While human rights norms teach
liberty and equality, most religious bodies teach authority and
hierarchy. While human rights norms encourage pluralism and
diversity, many religious bodies require orthodoxy and uniformity.
While human rights norms teach freedoms of speech and petition,
several religions teach duties of silence and submission. To draw
human rights norms into the structures ofreligion would seem only
to embolden members to demand greater access to religious
governance, greater freedom from religious discipline, greater
latitude in the definition of religious doctrine and liturgy. So why
import them?
Moreover, human rights norms challenge the spirit of religious
bodies. Human rights norms, religious skeptics argue, are the creed
of a secular faith born of Enlightenment liberalism, humanism, and
rationalism. Human rights advocates regularly describe these
norms as our new "civic faith," "our new world religion," "our new
global moral language." 9 The influential French jurist Karel Vasak
pressed these sentiments into a full confession of the secular spirit
of the modern human rights movement:
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [of 1948], like the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in
1789, has had an immense impact throughout the world. It has
been called a modern addition to the New Testament, and the
Magna Carta ofhumanity, and has become a constant source of
inspiration for governments, for judges and for national and
international legislators ....
[Bly recognizing the Universal

39. See examples in TRAER, supranote 34, at 1-2; van der Vyver, supranote 21, at 43-45.
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Declaration as a living document... one can proclaim one's
faith in the future of mankind. 0
In demonstration of this new faith, Vasak converted the "old
trinity" of "libert6, equalitY, et fraternit6" taught by the French
Revolution, into a "new trinity" of "three generations of rights" for
all humanity.4 1 The first generation of civil and political rights
elaborates on the meaning of liberty. The second generation of
social, cultural, and economic rights elaborates on the meaning of
equality. The third generation of solidarity rights to development,
peace, health, the environment, and open communication elaborates
on the meaning of fraternity. Such language has become not only
the lingua franca but also something of the lingua sacra of the
modern human rights movement. 2 In the face of such an overt
confession of secular liberalism, religious skeptics conclude, a
religious body would do well to resist the ideas and institutions of
human rights.
Both these skeptical arguments, however, presuppose that
human rights norms constitute a static belief system born of
Enlightenment liberalism. But the human rights regime is not
static. It is fluid, elastic, and open to challenge and change. The
human rights regime is not a fundamental belief system. It is a
relative system of ideas and ideals that presupposes the existence
of fundamental beliefs and values that will constantly shape and
reshape it. The human rights regime is not the child of
40. Karel Vasak,A 30-Year Struggle, UNESCO CouaiRM, Nov. 1977, at 29; see also Karel
Vasak, Forewordto THEINTERNATIONALDIMENSIONS OFHUMANRIGHTS xv (KarelVasak ed.,
1982) (quoting favorably from a UNESCO document: "Human rights are neither a new
morality nor a lay religion and are much more than a language common to all mankind").
Two years later, however, he published an article more in line with his 1977 views. See Karel
Vasak, Pourune troime g~nerationdesdroitde l'homme, in IkTUDES FTESSAIS SURLEDRoIT
INTERNATIONAL HUmANAIRE ET SUR LES PRINCIPES DE LA CROIX-ROUGE EN L'HONNEUR DE
JEAN PICTET [STUDIES AND ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL HumAARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS

PIRNcIPLF, INHONOURoFJEAN PICe=] 837-45 (Christophe Swinarksi ed., 1984) [hereinafter
Vasak, Pourune trois~meginiration].
41. See Vasak, Pour une troisicmegdniration,supra note 40, at 837.
42. See, e.g., Joy Gordon, The Concept ofHumanRights: The History andMeaningof its
Politicization,23 BROOIL J. INTfLL. 689 (1998); Stephen P. Marks, EmergingHumanRights:
A New Generationfor the 1980s2, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435 (1981); Burns H. Weston, Human
Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 257 (1984); Jennifer A. Downs, Note, A Healthy and Ecologically
BalancedEnvironment:AnArgument fora Third GenerationRight, 3 DUtXE J. COmP. &INTL
L. 351 (1993).
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Enlightenment liberalism, nor a ward under its exclusive
guardianship. It is the ius gentiurn of our times, the common law of
nations, which a variety of Hebrew, Greek, Roman, Christian, and
Enlightenment movements have historically nurtured in the West
and that today still needs the constant nurture of multiple
communities, in the West and well beyond. It is beyond doubt that
current formulations of human rights are suffused with
fundamental libertarian beliefs and values, some of which run
counter to the cardinal beliefs of various religious traditions. But
libertarianism does not and should not have a monopoly on the
nurture of human rights; indeed, a human rights regime cannot
long survive under its exclusive patronage.
I use the antique term ius gentium advisedly to signal the place
of human rights as "middle axioms" in our moral and political
discourse.' Historically, western writers spoke of a hierarchy of
laws-from natural law (ius naturale), to common law (ius
gentium), to civil law (ius civile). The natural law was the set of
immutable principles of reason and conscience, which are supreme
in authority and divinity and must always prevail in instances of
dispute. The civil law was the set of enacted laws and procedures
of local political communities, reflecting their immediate policies
and procedures. Between these two sets of norms was the ius
gentium, which served as the set of principles and customs common
to several communities and often the basis for treaties and other
diplomatic conventions. The contents of the ius gentium gradually
changed over time and across cultures as new interpretations of the
natural law were offered and as new formulations of the positive
law became increasingly conventional. But the ius gentium was a
relatively consistent body of principles by which a person and a
people could govern themselves.
This antique typology helps one to understand the intermediate
place of human rights in our modern hierarchy of legal and cultural
norms. Human rights are the ius gentium of our time, the middle
43. See comparable comments, from a Muslim perspective, in Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa'im, Towards an Islamic Hermeneutics for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
RELIGIOUS VALUES: AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP 229, 229-42 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im et
al. eds., 1995). For a Catholic perspective, see Robert P. George, Response, in APRESERVING
GRACE: PROTESTANTS, CATHOLICS, AND NATURAL LAw 157, 157-61 (Michael Cromartie ed.,
1997) [hereinafter A PRESERVING GRACE]; MARITAIN, supra note 32, at 97-101.
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axioms of our discourse. They are derived from and dependent upon
the transcendent principles that religious traditions (more than any
other group) continue to cultivate. They also inform, and are
informed by, shifts in the customs and conventions of sundry state
law systems. These human rights norms do gradually change over
time: just compare the international human rights instruments of
1948 with those of today. But human rights norms are a relatively
stable set of ideals by which a person and community might be
guided and judged.
This antique typology also helps one to understand the place of
human rights within religion. My argument that human rights
must have a more prominent place within religions today is not an
attempt to import libertarian ideals into their theologies and
polities. It is not an attempt to herd Trojan horses into churches,
synagogues, mosques, and temples to assail secretly their spirit and
structure. My argument is, rather, that religious bodies must again
assume their traditional patronage and protection of human rights,
bringing to this regime their full doctrinal vigor, liturgical healing,
and moral suasion. Using our antique typology, religious bodies
must again nurture and challenge the middle axioms of the ius
gentium using the transcendent principles of the ius naturale.This
must not be an effort to monopolize the discourse, nor to establish
by positive law a particular religious construction of human
rights." Such an effort must be part of a collective discourse of
competing understandings of the ius naturale-of competing
theological views of the divine and the human, of good and evil, of
individuality and community-that will serve constantly to inform
and reform, to develop and deepen, the human rights ideals now in
place.45
44. For a provocative illustration of this proposed methodology of pluralistic religious
witness, see DUNCANB.FoRRESTER, CHRISTiANJUSTICEAND PUBLICPOLICY (1997). Forrester

argues that "Christian theology, though it can no longer claim to provide a comprehensive
theory of justice, can provide insights into justice--theological fragments'-which give
illumination, challenge some aspects of the conventional wisdom, and contribute to the
building ofjust communities in which people may flourish in mutuality and hope." Id. at 34.
45. For a theological perspective, see WOLFGANG HUBER, GERECHTIGKEIT UND RECHT.
GRUNDLnMN CHRISTCHER REcmErrHuK 252, 366, 446 (1996); Wolfgang Huber, Human

Rights andBiblicalLegalThought, inRELIGIOUSHUMANRIGHTS I, supranote *, at 47, 59-63;
see also Jerome J. Shestack, The Jurisprudenceof Human Rights, in HuMAN RIGmTs IN
INTERNATIONALLAW: LEGALANDPOLICYISSUES 69,75 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); Christina
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A. An EmergingHuman Rights Hermeneutic
A number of religious traditions oflate have begun the process of
reengaging the regime of human rights, of returning to their
traditional roots and routes of nurturing and challenging the
human rights regime. This process has been incremental, clumsy,
controversial, and at times even fatal for its proponents. But the
process of religious engagement of human rights is now under way
in Christian, Islamic, Judaic, Buddhist, Hindu, and traditional
communities alike. Something of a new "human rights
hermeneutic" is slowly beginning to emerge among modern
religions. 6
This is, in part, a "hermeneutic of confession." Given their
checkered human rights records over the centuries, religious bodies
have begun to acknowledge their departures from the cardinal
teachings of peace and love that are the heart of their sacred texts
and traditions. Christian churches have taken the lead in this
process-from the Second Vatican Council's confession of prior
complicity in authoritarianism, to the contemporary church's
repeated confessions of prior support for apartheid, communism,
racism, sexism, fascism, and anti-Semitism."7 Other communities
have also begun this process-from recent Muslim academics'
M. Cerna, UniversalityofHuman Rights and CulturalDiversity:ImplementationofHuman
Rights inDifferentSocio-CulturalContexts, 16 HuM.RTS. Q. 740,740-52 (1994); David Tracy,
Religion and Human Rights in the Public Realm, 112(4) DAEDALUS 237 (1983).
46. For good examples among the three religions of the Book, see AN-NA'I, supra note
25; Riffat Hassan, Rights of Women Within Islamic Communities, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS I, supra note *, at 361; HUBER & TODT, supra note 36, at 158-83, 222-321, 362-419;

NOVAK, supranote 36; David Novak, ReligiousHumanRightsin Judaic Texts, in RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS I, supra note *, at 175; MAX STACKHOUSE, CREEDS, SOCIETY, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1984). On emerging rights talk within various Asian and African religions, see WM.
THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN
PERSPECTIVE (1998); CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wm. Theodore de Bary & Tu
Weiming eds., 1998); RELIGIOUS DIVERSrY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Irene Bloom et al. eds.,
1996); THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A- Bell
eds., 1999).
47. See Luke Timothy Johnson, Religious Rights and Christian Texts, in RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS I, supra note *, at 65, 70-73; John S. Pobee, Africa's Search for Religious

HumanRights Through Returningto Wells ofLiving Water, in RELIGIOUS HUMANRIGHTS II,
supranote *, at 391,411-13; Charles Villa-Vicencio, FromRevolution to Reconstruction:The
SouthAfricaImperative,in CHRISTIANITYAND DEMOCRACYIN GLOBAL CONTEXT 249-66 (John
Witte, Jr. ed., 1993) [hereinafter CHRISTIANITYAND DEMOCRACY]; CHARLESVILLA-VICENCIO,
A THEOLOGY OF RECONSTRUCTION: NATION BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1992).
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condemnations of the politicization of "jihad" to the Dalai Lama's
recent lamentations over the "sometimes sorry human rights
record" of both his own and rival traditions.48
This is, in part, a "hermeneutic of suspicion," to use Paul
Ricoeur's phrase. Given the pronounced libertarian tone of many
recent human rights formulations, it is imperative that we not
idolize or idealize these formulations. We need not be bound by
current taxonomies of"three generations of rights" rooted inliberty,
equality, and fraternity.49 Commonlaw formulations of "life, liberty,
or property," canon law formulations of "natural, ecclesiastical, and
civil rights," or Protestant formulations of "civil, theological, and
pedagogical uses" of rights might well be more apt classification
schemes. We need not accept the seemingly infinite expansion of
human rights discourse and demands. Rights bound by moral
duties, by natural capacities, or by covenantal relationships might
well provide better boundaries to the legitimate expression and
extension of rights. We also need not be bound only to a centralized
legal methodology of articulating and enforcing rights. We might
also consider a more pluralistic model of interpretation that
respects "the right of the [local community to be the living frame
of interpretation for their own religion and its normative regime."50
This is, in part, a "hermeneutic of history." While acknowledging
the fundamental contributions of Enlightenment liberalism to the
modern rights regime, we must also see the deeper genesis and
genius of many modern rights norms in religious texts and
traditions that antedate the Enlightenment by centuries, if not
millennia. We must return to our religious sources. In part, this is
a return to ancient sacred texts freed from the casuistic accretions
of generations ofjurists and freed from the cultural trappings of the
communities in which these traditions were born. In part, this is a
return to slender streams oftheological jurisprudence that have not
been part of the mainstream of the religious traditions, or have
become diluted by too great a commingling with it. In part, this is
a return to prophetic voices of dissent, long purged from traditional
48. See AN-NA, supra note 25, at 171-72; Farid Esack, Muslims Engagingthe Other
and the Humanum, in SHARING THE BOOK, supra note 20, at 118, 119-20; Dalai Lama,
Commencement Address ofthe Dalai Lama at Emory University (May 11, 1998).
49. See supranote 41 and accompanying text.
50. AN-NAaI, supranote 25, at 235.

726

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:707

religious canons, but, in retrospect, prescient of some of the rights
roles that the tradition might play today.
Permit me to illustrate this budding new human rights
hermeneutic using my own tradition of Christianity. There are
various ways to tell the Christian part of this story. One can
analyze the rights contributions of seminal figures from Christ and
the early Church Fathers onward. One can sift through the complex
patterns of rights talk of various regional and national Christian
groups. One can dig into the daily rights narratives of discrete
communities of the faithful in different social and political contexts.
Ultimately, these and other genres of analysis will need to be
pursued and combined to come to full terms with the Christian
Church's past and potential contribution to human rights, including
religious rights.
To outline the main Christian story here, permit me to analyze
briefly the rights contributions of the three main Catholic,
Protestant, and Orthodox traditions of Christianity. I have told
parts of this story before.51 But some readers have, quite properly,
52
criticized me for speaking with "too Protestant" an accent.
Herewith I commence with at least a partial purgation.
B. Human Rights and Catholicism
The Roman Catholic Church is, paradoxically, the first and the
last of the three great traditions of Christianity to embrace the
doctrine of human rights. At the opening of the second millennium
of the common era, the Catholic Church led the first great human
rights movement of the West in the name of "freedom of the church"

51. See JoHN WnmTs, JR., RELIGIONAND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 1-

56 (2000) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN EXPERIMNT]; The Biography and Biology ofLiberty:
AbrahamKuyper andthe American Experiment, in RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE:
ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LEGACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 243-62 (Luis Lugo et al. eds., 2000)

[hereinafter The American Experiment]; John Witte, Jr., The Development of Herman
Dooyeweerd's Concept ofRights, 110(3) S. AFRICAN L. J. 543-62 (1993); John Witte, Jr., How
to Govern a City on a Hill: The EarlyPuritanContributionto American Constitutionalism,
39 EMORYL.J. 41 (1990) [hereinafter Witte, How to Govern a City on a Hill]; John Witte, Jr.,
Moderate Religious Liberty in the Theology of John Calvin, 31 CALVIN THEOLOGICAL J. 359
(1996) [hereinafter Witte, ModerateReligious Liberty].
52. See Richard W. Garnett, FrancisBacon Takes on the Ghouls, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 447,
453-54 (2000).
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(libertasecclesiae). During the Papal Revolution of Pope Gregory
VII (1073-1085) and his successors, the Catholic clergy threw off
their royal and civil rulers and established the church as an
autonomous legal and political corporation within western
Christendom.' For the first time, the church successfully claimed
jurisdiction over such persons as clerics, pilgrims, students, Jews,
and Muslims. It also claimed jurisdiction over such subjects as
doctrine and liturgy, ecclesiastical property, polity, patronage,
marriage and family relations, education, charity, inheritance, oral
promises, oaths, various contracts, and all manner of moral and
ideological crimes." The Church predicated these jurisdictional
claims in part on Christ's famous delegation of the keys to St. Peter
(Matthew 16:18)-a key of knowledge to discern God's word and
will and a key of power to implement and enforce that word and
will by law.55 The Church also predicated these claims on its
traditional authority over the form and function of the Christian
sacraments.' By the fifteenth century, the Church had gathered
around the seven sacraments whole systems of canon law rules that
prevailed throughout the West.5"
The medieval canon law was based, in part, on the concept of
individual and corporate rights (iura).The canon law defined the
rights of the clergy to their liturgical offices and ecclesiastical
benefices, their exemptions from civil taxes and duties, and their
immunities from civil prosecution and compulsory testimony. It
defined the rights of ecclesiastical organizations like parishes,
monasteries, charities, and guilds to form and dissolve, to accept
and reject members, to establish order and discipline, to acquire,
use, and alienate property. It defined the rights of church councils
and synods to participate in the election and discipline of bishops,
abbots, and other clergy. It defined the rights of the laity to
worship, evangelize, maintain religious symbols, participate in the
sacraments, travel on religious pilgrimages, and educate their
53. See HAROLD J. BEBRAmN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 94-113 (1983).

54. See id.
55. See BRIAN TIERNEY, ORIGINS OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY, 1150-1350, 39-45, 82-121
(1972).
56. See iaL
57. See id.; R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 1-32 (1996); LEX ET
SACRA31ENTULI I MITrELALTER (Paul Wilpert ed., 1969).
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children. It defined the rights of the poor, widows, and the needy to
seek solace, succor, and sanctuary within the church. A good deal
of the rich latticework of medieval canon law was cast, substantively and procedurally, in the form and language of rights."
To be sure, such rights were not unguided by duties, nor were
they available to all parties. Only the Catholic faithful-and
notoriously not Jews, Muslims, or heretics 59-- had full rights
protection, and their rights were to be exercised with appropriate
ecclesiastical and sacramental constraints. But the basic medieval
rights formulations of exemptions, immunities, privileges, and
benefits, and the free exercise of religious worship, travel, speech,
and education have persisted, with ever greater inclusivity, to this
day. Many of the common formulations of individual and collective
rights and liberties in vogue today were first forged, not by John
Locke or James Madison, but by twelfth- and thirteenth-century
canonists and theologians.
It was, in part, the perceived excesses of the sixteenth-century
Protestant Reformation that closed the door to the Catholic
Church's own secular elaboration of this refined rights regime. The
Council of Trent (1545-1563) confirmed, with some modifications,
the internal rights structure of the canon law. These formulations
were elaborated in the writings of Spanish and Portuguese neoscholastics.6" But the Church left it largely to nonchurch bodies and
non-Catholic believers to draw out the secular implications of the
medieval human rights tradition. The Catholic Church largely
tolerated Protestant and humanist rights efforts in the later
58. See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS,
NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAw 1150-1625 (1997) [hereinafter THE IDEA OF NATURAL
RIGHTS]; Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: An HistoricalPerspective, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS I, supra note *, at 17; Brian Tierney, RIGHTS, LAW, AND INFALLIBILITY IN MEDIEVAL

THOUGHT (1997); Charles J. Reid, Jr., Thirteenth Century CanonLaw and Rights: The Word
ius and Its Range of Subjective Meanings, 30 STUDIA CANONICA 295 (1996); Charles J. Reid,
Jr., Roots of a Democratic Church Polity in the History of the Canon Law, 60 CLSA
PROCEEDINGS 150 (1998); Charles J. Reid, Jr., Rights in Thirteenth Century Canon Law: An
Historical Investigation (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell Univ.) (on file with
author).
59. See SOLOMON GRAYZEL, THE CHURCH AND THE JEWS IN THE XIIITH CENTURY (1989);
JAMES PARKES, THE JEW IN THE MEDIEVAL COmMUNITY: A STUDY OF HIS POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC SITUATION 239-66 (2d ed. 1976); PERSECUTIONAND TOLERATION (W.J. Sheils ed.,
1984).
60. See THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS, supranote 58.
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sixteenth century and beyond, which built, in part- on biblical and
canon law foundations. The Church grew increasingly intolerant,
however, of the rights theories ofthe Enlightenment, which built on
secular theories of individualism and rationalism. Enlightenment
teachings on liberties, rights, and separation of church and state
conflicted directly with Catholic teachings on natural law, the
common good, and subsidiarity. The Church's intolerance of such
formulations gave way to outright hostility after the French
Revolution, most notably in the blistering Syllabus of Errors of
1864.61 Notwithstanding the social teachings of subsequent
instruments, such as Rerum Novarum,in 1891, and Quadragesimo
Anno, in 1934, the Catholic Church had little patience with the
human rights reforms and democratic regimes of the later
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It acquiesced more
readily in the authoritative regimes and policies that governed the
European, Latin American, and African nations where Catholicism
62
was strong.
The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) (Vatican II) and
subsequent initiatives transformed the Catholic Church's
theological attitude toward human rights and democracy. In a
series of sweeping new doctrinal statements, from Mater et
Magistra,in 1961, onward, the Church came to endorse many of the
very same human rights and democratic principles that it had
spurned a century before.' First, the Church endorsed human
rights and liberties-not only in the internal, canon law context, but
also now in a global, secular law context.64 Every person, the
Church taught, is created by God "with intelligence and free will"
and has rights "flowing directly and simultaneously from his very
61. SeePopePius ]X, SyllabusofErrorsConcerningtheLiberalldeology(1864),reprinted
in CHUECHANDSTATETIROUGHTHECENTURIES 281 (SidneyZ. Ehler&JohnB. Morralleds.,
1954) [hereinafter CHURCH AND STATE].

62. See

DAVID HOLLENBACH, CLAIMS IN CONFLICT. RETRIEVING AND RENEWING THE

CATHOLIC HUMAN RIGHTS TRADITION 42 (1979); JOHN COURTNEYMURRAY, THE PROBLEM OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 3-6 (1965); NOONAN, LUSTRE OF OURCOUNTRY, supra note 22, at 331-53;
CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 61, at 281-355; John Courtney Murray, The Problem of
ReligiousFreedom,25 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 503-75 (1964); Mary Elsbernd, Papal Statements
on Rights: AHistorical Contextual Study of Encyclical Teachings from Pius VI-Pius XI (17911939) (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic Univ. of Louvain).
63. See HOLLENBACH, supra note 62, at 62-63.
64. See id.
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nature.""5 Such rights include the right to life and adequate
standards of living, to moral and cultural values, to religious
activities, to assembly and association, to marriage and family life,
and to various social, political, and economic benefits and
opportunities.6" The Church emphasized the religious rights of
conscience, worship, assembly, and education, calling them the
"first rights" of any civic order.6 7 The Church also stressed the need
to balance individual and associational rights, particularly those
involving the church, family, and school. Governments everywhere
were encouraged to create conditions conducive to the realization
and protection of these "inviolable rights" and encouraged to root
out everytype of discrimination, whether social or cultural, whether
based on sex, race, color, social distinction, language, or religion.68
Second, as a corollary, the Church advocated limited constitutional
government, disestablishment of religion, and the separation of
church and state.69 The vast pluralism of religions and cultures, and
the inherent dangers in state endorsement of any religion, in the
Church's view, rendered mandatory such democratic forms of
government.70
Vatican II and its progeny transformed not only the theological
attitude but also the social actions of the Catholic Church
respecting human rights and democracy. After Vatican II, the
Church was less centralized and more socially active. Local bishops
and clergy were given greater autonomy and incentive to
participate in local and national affairs, to bring the Church's new
doctrines to bear on matters both political and cultural. Particularly
in North America and Europe, bishops and bishops' conferences
became active in cultivating and advocating a variety of political
and legal reforms. Likewise, in Latin America, the rise of liberation
theologies and base communities helped to translate many of the
enduring and evolving rights perspectives of the Church into
intensely active social and political programs. The Catholic Church
65. Pacem in Terris, para. 9 (1963), reprinted in THE GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE:
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING SINCE POPE JOHN 201, 203 (Joseph Gremillion ed., 1976).

66. See id. at 203-08.
67. See id. at 203-04.

68. See id. at 209-10.
69. See id. at 216-18.
70. See DignitatisHumanaeDeclaration
[OnReligiousFreedom](1965), reprintedin THE
DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN 11675 (Walter M. Abbott & Joseph Gallagher eds., 1967).
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was thereby transformed from a passive accomplice in authoritarian regimes to a powerful advocate of democratic and human
rights reform. The Catholic Church has been a critical force in the
new wave of political democratization that has been breaking over
the world since the early 1970s, both through the announcements
and interventions of the papacy and through the efforts of its local
clergy. New democratic and human rights movements in Brazil,
Chile, Central America, the Philippines, South Korea, Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and elsewhere owe much of
to the teaching and activity of the Catholic
their inspiration
71
Church.
The Catholic Church has thus come full circle. The Church led
the first human rights movement of the West at the opening of the
second millennium. It stands ready to lead the next human rights
movement, this time of the world, at the opening of the third
millennium-equipped with a refined theology and law of human
rights and some one billion members worldwide. The Catholic
Church offers a unique combination of local and global, confessional
and universal human rights strategies for the next century. Within
the internal forum and the canon law, the Church has a distinctly
Catholic human rights framework that protects especially the
second generation rights of education, charity, and health care
within a sacramental and sacerdotal context. Within the external
forum of the world and its secular law, however, the Church has a
decidedly universal human rights framework that advocates
especially first generation civil and political rights for all. Some
critics view this two-pronged human rights ministry as a selfserving attempt to advocate equality and liberty without the
Church, but to perpetuate patriarchy and elitism within.72 But this
criticism has had little apparent effect. The Catholic Church's
human rights ministry, if pursued with the zealotry shown by the
current episcopacy, promises to have a monumental effect on law,
religion, and human rights in the next century.
71. SeeJ. BryanHehir, CatholicismandDemocracy:Conflict, Change,and Collaboration,
in CHIUSTIANrrYAND DEMOCRACY, supranote 47, at 15, 25-28; Hehir, supranote 34, at 10719; GEORGE WEIGEL, THE FINAL REVOLUTION: THE RESISTANCE CHURCH AND THE COLLAPSE

OF COMMUNISM 16, 77-102, 191-209 (1992).
72. See William Johnson Everett, Human Rights in the Church, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS I, supra note *, at 121, 125-31.
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C. Human Rights and Protestantism
One of the ironies of the contemporary human rights movement
is the relative silence of the Protestant churches. Historically,
Protestant churches produced some of the most refined theories and
laws of human rights. Today, many Protestant churches have been
content simply to confirm human rights norms and to condemn
human rights abuses without deep corporate theological reflection.
To be sure, some leading Protestant lights have taken up the
subject in their writings.73 A number of Protestant groups within
the church, particularly new liberationist and feminist groups, have
developed important new themes.74 The American Civil Rights
Movement found some of its strongest support among Baptist,
Methodist, and other Free Churches. The ecumenical movement,
especially the World Council of Churches, consolidated the efforts
of many Protestant denominations."v But, to date, no comprehensive
and systematic human rights theory or program has taken the
Protestant field. Twentieth-century Protestantism produced no
John Courtney Murray and no Vatican II.
The irony of this is that the Protestant Reformation was, in
effect, the second great human rights movement of the West. Prior
to the sixteenth century, there was one universal Catholic faith and
Church, one universal system of canon law and sacramental life,
one universal hierarchy of courts and administrators centered in
Rome that ruled throughout much ofthe West. Martin Luther, John
Calvin, Thomas Cranmer, Menno Simons, and other leading
sixteenth-century reformers all began their movements with a call
for freedom from this ecclesiastical regime-freedom of the
individual conscience from intrusive canon laws and clerical
73. See, e.g., 1-3 HANS DoMBOIS, DAS REcHT DER GNADE (1969); FORRESTER, supra note
44; HUBER & REUTER, supranote 18; HUBER AND TODT, supranote 36; STACKHOUSE, supra
note 46; JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER, SEVEN LECTURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1976).
74. See VICENCIO, ATHEOLOGY OF RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 47.
75. See A CHRISTIAN DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THEOLOGICAL STUDIES OF THE
WORLD ALLIANCE OF REFORMED CHURCHES (Allen 0. Miller ed., 1977); HUBER AND TODT,
supra note 36; JORGEN MOLTMANN, ON HUMAN DIGNITY, POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND ETHICS
(M. Douglas Meeks trans. 1984); LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION, THEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1977); NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, Human Rights
Office, LIFE IN ALL ITS FULLNESS: THE WORD OF GOD AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1998); 1-3 WORLD
COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHRISTIAN RESPONSIBILITY (1975).
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controls, freedom of political officials from ecclesiastical power and
privileges, freedom of the local clergy from central papal rule and
oppressive princely controls. "Freedom of the Christian" became the
rallying cry of the early Reformation. It drove theologians and
jurists, clergy and laity, princes and peasants alike to denounce
canon laws and ecclesiastical authorities with unprecedented
alacrity and to urge radical constitutional reforms. 6
The Protestant Reformation permanently broke the unity of
western Christendom, and thereby introduced the foundations for
the modern constitutional system of confessional pluralism.
The Lutheran Reformation territorialized the faith through the
principle of cuius regio, eius religio (whoseever region, his religion),
established by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555." Under this
principle, princes or city councils were authorized to prescribe the
appropriate forms of Evangelical or Catholic doctrine, liturgy, and
education for their polities. Religious dissenters were granted the
right to worship privately in their homes or to emigrate peaceably
from the polity. After decades of bitter civil war, the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648 extended this privilege to Reformed Calvinists
as well, rendering Germany and beyond a veritable honeycomb of
religious plurality for the next two centuries.
The Anglican Reformation nationalized the faith through the
famous Supremacy Acts and, the Acts of Uniformity passed from
1534 to 1559. Citizens of the Commonwealth of England were
required to be communicants of the Church of England, subject to
the final ecclesiastical and political authority of the Monarch. The
Toleration Act of 1689 extended a modicum of rights to some
Protestant dissenters.7 8 But it was not until the Jewish and
Catholic Emancipation Acts of 1829 and 1833 that the national
identity of the Church and Commonwealth of England was finally
formally broken. 9

76. The remainder of this section is drawn from THEAMERICANEXPERIMENT, supranote
51, at 14-19 and sources cited therein.
77. See Religious Peace of Augsburg, Sept. 25, 1555, reprintedin CHURCH AND STATE,
supra note 61, at 164.
78. See CHURCHAND STATE, supra note 61, at 215-16.
79. See JOSEPH LEcLER, 14 TOLERATION AND THE REFORMATION (T.L. Westow trans.,
1960).
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The Anabaptist Reformation communalized the faith by introducing what Menno Simons once called the Scheidingsmaurer:the
wall of separation between the redeemed realm of religion and the
fallen realm of the world. Anabaptist religious communities were
ascetically withdrawn from the world into small, self-sufficient,
intensely democratic communities, governed internally by biblical
principles of discipleship, simplicity, charity, and Christian
obedience. When such communities grew too large or divided, they
deliberately colonized themselves, eventually spreading Anabaptist
communities from Russia and Ireland to the furthest frontiers of
North America. 80

The Calvinist Reformation congregationalized the faith by
introducing the notion of rule by a democratically elected consistory
of pastors, elders, and deacons. 8 ' In John Calvin's day, the Geneva
consistory was still appointed and held broad personal and subject
matter jurisdiction over all members of the city. By the seventeenth
century, however, most Calvinist communities in Europe and North
America reduced the consistory to an elected, representative system
of government within each church. These consistories featured
separation of the offices of preaching, discipline, and charity, as
well as a fluid, dialogical form of religious polity and policing
centered around collective worship and the congregational meeting.
The Protestant Reformation also broke the primacy of corporate
Christianity and placed new emphasis on the role of the individual
believer in the economy of salvation. The Protestant Reformation
did not invent the individual, as too many exuberant commentators
still maintain. Rather, sixteenth-century Protestant reformers,
more than their Catholic contemporaries, gave new emphasis to the
(religious) rights and liberties of individuals at both religious law
and civil law.
This new emphasis on the individual was true even in the
more intensely communitarian traditions of Anglicanism and
Anabaptism. The Anglican Book of Common Prayerwas designed,

80. See ANABAprISM IN OUTINE: SELECTED PRIMARY SOURCES (Walter Klaassen ed.,
1973); ROBERT FRIEDMANN, THE THEOLOGY OF ANABAPTIsM (1973); 1, 2 WILLIAM C.
MCLOUGHLIN,NEWENGLANDDISSENT 1630-1833 (1971); THERECOVERYOFTHEANABAPTIST
VISION (Guy F. Hershberger ed., 1957).
81. See Witte, ModerateReligious Liberty, supra note 51, at 392-93.
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in Thomas Cranmer's words, as a "textbook of liberty." 2 The daily
office of the lectionary, together with the vernacular Bible,
encouraged the exercise of private devotion outside the church. The
choices among liturgical rites and prayers within the Prayer Book
encouraged the exercise of at least some clerical innovation within
the church, with such opportunities for variation and innovation
increasing with the 1662 and 1789 editions of the Prayer Book.
The Anabaptist doctrine of adult baptism gave new emphasis to
a voluntarist understanding of religion, as opposed to conventional
notions of a birthright or predestined faith. The adult individual
was now called to make a conscientious choice to accept the
faith-metaphorically, to scale the wall of separation between the
fallen world and the realm of religion to come within the perfection
of Christ. Later, Free Church followers converted this cardinal
image into a powerful platform of liberty of conscience, free exercise
of religion, and separation of church and state, not only for
Christians but also eventually for all peaceable believers. Their
views had a great influence on the formation of constitutional
protections of religious liberty in eighteenth-and-nineteenthcentury North America and Western Europe. 3
The Lutheran and Calvinist branches of the Reformation laid the
anthropological basis for an even more expansive theory and law of
rights." Classic Protestant theology teaches that a person is both
saint and sinner. On the one hand, a person is created in the image
of God and justified by faith in God. The person is called to a
distinct vocation, which stands equal in dignity and sanctity to all
others. The person is prophet, priest, and king who is responsible
to exhort, minister, and rule in the community. Every person,
therefore, stands equal before God and before his or her neighbor.
Every person is vested with a natural liberty to live, to believe, and
to serve God and neighbor. Every person is entitled to the
vernacular Scripture, to education, and to work in a vocation. On
the other hand, the person is sinful and prone to evil and egoism.
He needs the restraint of the law to deter him from evil and to drive
him to repentance. He needs the association of others to exhort,
82. See, e.g., THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 1559 (John E. Booty ed., 1976).
83. See Max L. Stackhouse & Deirdre King Hainsworth, Decidingfor God: The Right to
Convert in ProtestantPerspectives,in SHARING THE BOOK, supra note 20, at 201, 201-30.
84. See Law, Religion and Human Rights, supra note *, at 22.
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minister, and rule him with law and with love. Every person,
therefore, is inherently a communal creature. Every person belongs
to a family, a church, and a political community.
These social institutions of family, church, and state, Protestants
believe, are divine in origin and human in organization. They are
created by God and governed by godly ordinances. They stand equal
before God and are called to discharge distinctive godly functions in
the community. The family is called to rear and nurture children,
to educate and discipline them, and to exemplify love and
cooperation. The church is called to preach the word, administer the
sacraments, educate the young, and aid the needy. The state is
called to protect order, punish crime, and promote community.
Though divine in origin, these institutions are formed through
human covenants. Such covenants confirm the divine
functions-the created offices--of these institutions. Such covenants also organize these offices so that they are protected from the
sinful excesses of officials who occupy them. Family, church, and
state are thus organized as public institutions, accessible and
accountable to each other and to their members. Specifically, the
church is to be organized as a democratic congregational polity,
with a separation of ecclesiastical powers among pastors, elders,
and deacons, election of officers to limited tenures, and ready
participation of the congregation in the life and leadership of the
church.
Protestant groups in Europe and America cast these theological
doctrines into democratic forms designed to protect human rights.
Protestant doctrines of the person and society were cast into
democratic social forms. Given that all persons stand equal before
God, they must stand equal before God's political agents in the
state. Given that God vested all persons with natural liberties of
life and belief, the state must ensure them of similar civil liberties.
Given that God has called all persons to be prophets, priests, and
kings, the state must protect their freedoms to speak, to preach,
and to rule in the community. Given that God has created persons
as social creatures, the state must promote and protect a plurality
of social institutions, particularly the church and the family.
Protestant doctrines of sin were cast into democratic political
forms. The political office must be protected against the sinfulness
of the political official. Political power, like ecclesiastical power,
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must be distributed among self-checking executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. Officials must be elected to limited terms of
office. Laws must be clearly codified and discretion closely guarded.
If officials abuse their offices, they must be disobeyed; if they
persist in their abuse, they must be removed, even if by force.
These Protestant teachings helped to inspire many of the early
modern revolutions fought in the name of human rights and
democracy.' They were the driving ideological forces behind the
revolts of the French Huguenots, Dutch pietists, and Scottish
Presbyterians against their monarchical oppressors in the later
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They were critical weapons in
the arsenal of the revolutionaries in England, America, and France.
They were important sources of the great age of democratic
construction in later eighteenth and nineteenth-century America
and Western Europe. In this century, Protestant ideas of human
rights and democracy helped to drive the constitutional reformation
of Europe in the post-War period, as well as many of the human
rights and democratic movements against colonial autocracy in
Africa and fascist revival in Latin America.
These cardinal Protestant teachings and practices have much to
offer the regime of human rights in the twenty-first century.
Protestant theology avoids the reductionist extremes of
libertarianism, which sacrifices the community for the individual,
and totalitarianism, which sacrifices the individual for the
community. It avoids the limitless expansion of human rights
claims by grounding these norms in the creation order, divine
callings, and covenant relationships. And it avoids uncritical
adoption of human rights by judging their civil, theological, and
educational uses in the lives of both individuals and communities.
On this foundation, Protestant theology strikes unique balances
between liberty and responsibility, dignity and depravity,
individuality and community, politics and pluralism.
To translate these theological principles into human rights
practices is the great challenge facing the Protestant churches in
the immediate future. The Protestant tradition needs to have its
own Vatican H, its own comprehensive and collective assessment of
85. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND
RELIGION 83-139 (1993).
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its future role in the human rights drama. Of course, Protestant
congregationalism militates against such collective action, as do the
many ancient animosities among Protestant sects. But this is no
time, and no matter, for denominational snobbery or sniping.
Protestants need to sow their own distinct seeds of human rights
while the field is still open. Else, there will be little to harvest and
little room to complain in this new century.
D. Human Rights and the Orthodox Tradition
The Orthodox churches, rooted in Eastern Christianity and the
Byzantine Empire, ground their human rights theology less in
the dignity of the person and more in the integrity of natural
law and the human community. To be sure, some of the earliest
Greek Fathers sounded familiar western themes of liberty of
conscience, human dignity, and free exercise of religion. For
example, Lactantius, the great fourth-century sage of the Orthodox
tradition, wrote: "[It is only in religion that liberty has chosen to
dwell. For nothing is so much a matter of free will as religion, and
no one can be required to worship what he does not will to
worship."8 6 Such sentiments have echoed in the Orthodox tradition
ever since-especially in the modern transplanted Orthodox communities of Western Europe and North America.
What has rendered the Orthodox human rights understanding
unique, however, is its distinct natural-law foundation.8 7 The
Orthodox Church emphasizes that God has written His natural law
on the hearts of all persons and rewritten it on the pages of
Scripture."8 This natural law, which finds its most sublime source
and summary in the Ten Commandments, prescribes a series of
86. J.P. MIGNE, PATROLOGIA LATINA, (1844-91) 6:516.54.
87. See S.L. FRANK, THE LIGHT SHINETH IN DARKNESS: AN ESSAY IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS
AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 112-89 (Boris Jakim trans., 1989); STANLEY S. HARAKAS, LET
MERCY ABOUND: SOCIAL CONCERN IN THE GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH (1983); Ion Bria,

Evangelism, Proselytism, and ReligiousFreedom in Romania:An OrthodoxPoint of View,
36 J. ECUMENICAL STUD. 163 (1999); Stanley S. Harakas, ChristianEthics in Ecumenical
Perspective, 15 J. ECUMENICAL STUD. 631-41 (1978); Stanley S. Harakas, Human Rights:An

Eastern Orthodox Perspective, 19 J. ECUMENICAL STUD. 13 (1982) [hereinafter Harakas,
Human Rights]; Anastasios Yannoulatos, EasternOrthodoxy and Human Rights, 73 INTL
REv. OF MISSION 454-66 (1984).
88. See Harakas, ChristianEthics in Ecumenical Perspective, supranote 87, at 640-41.
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duties that each person owes to others and to God, such as not to
kill, not to steal, not to bear false witness, not to swear falsely, not
to serve other gods. 9 Humanity's fall into sin has rendered
adherence to such moral duties imperative to the survival of the
human community. God has called church and state alike to
assume responsibility for enforcing by law those moral duties that
are essential to such survival.
According to classic Orthodox theology, human rights are the
reciprocals of these divinely ordained moral duties. One person's
moral duties not to kill, steal, or bear false witness give rise to
another person's rights to life, property, and dignity. A person's
moral duties not to serve other gods or swear falsely give rise to his
right to serve the right god and to swear properly. For every moral
duty taught by natural law, there is a reciprocal moral right.90
On the strength of this ancient biblical ethic, Orthodox churches
endorse a three-tiered system of rights and duties: (1) a Christian
or "evangelical" system of rights and duties based on the natural
law principles of Scripture, which are enforced by the canon law
and sacramental theology of the church; (2) a "common moral"
system of rights and duties based on universal natural-law
principles accepted by rational persons in all times and places,
which are enforced by moral agents within the community; and (3)
a legal system of rights and duties based on the constitutional laws
and social needs of the community, which are enforced by the
positive laws of the state.91 The church not only has a responsibility
to maintain the highest standards of moral right and duty among
its subjects, but also to serve as a moral agent in the community, to
cultivate an understanding of "common morality" and to admonish
pastorally92 and prophetically those who violate this common
morality.

Particularly during the long winter of Marxist-Leninist rule,
Orthodox Churches throughout the world let their pastoral and
prophetic voices be heard in endorsement of human rights and in
condemnation of their violation.93 The World Congress of Orthodox
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Harakas, Human Rights, supra note 87, at 18-19.
See id. at 13-18.
See i at 14-15.
See Harakas, ChristianEthics in Ecumenical Perspective,supranote 87, at 631-46.
See Harakas, Human Rights, supranote 87, at 20.
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Bishops (1978), for example, greeted the 30th anniversary of the
United Nations Declaration of Rights with the call:
We urge all Orthodox Christians to mark this occasion with
prayers for those whose human rights are being denied and/or
violated; for those who are harassed and persecuted because of
their religious beliefs, Orthodox and non-Orthodox alike, in
many parts of the world; for those whose rightful demands and
persistence are met with greater oppression and ignominy; and
for those whose agony for justice, food, shelter, health care and
education is accelerated with each passing day."
In 1980, the 25th Clergy-Laity Congress of the Greek Orthodox
Archdiocese of North and South America pronounced, on the
strength of "a universal natural law," that:
human rights consist of those conditions of life that allow us
fully to develop and use our human qualities of intelligence and
conscience to their fullest extent and to satisfy our spiritual,
social and political needs, including freedom of expression,
freedom from fear, harassment, intimidation and discrimination
and freedom to participate in the functions of government and
to have the guarantee of the equal protection of law.9 5
They further called upon "totalitarian and oppressive regimes to
restore respect for the rights and dignity of the individual and to
insure the free and unhindered exercise of these vital rights by all
citizens, regardless of racial or ethnic origin, or political or religious
espousal."" "All people," the Orthodox Congress later declared,
have the God-given riglht to be free from interference by
government or others in (1) freely determining their faith by
conscience, (2) freely associating and organizing with others for
religious purposes, (3) expressing their religious beliefs in
94. ARCHmIoCsAN ARCHIVES (Dec. 1978) (statement by Standing Conference of
Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas), quotedin Harakas, Human Rights,supranote
87, at 21.
95. Minutes, Decisions,Resolutions andStatements ofthe 25th Clergy-Laity Congressof
the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America in Atlanta, Georgia 114-15
(June 27 - July 5, 1980), quoted in Harakas, Human Rights, supranote 87, at 26.
96. Id.
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worship, teaching and practice, (4) and pursuing the
implications of their beliefs in the social and political
community.'
The Orthodox churches have also begun to move gradually
toward a greater separation of church and state, though seemingly
more out of political necessity than theological conviction.
Classically, the Orthodox Church had no concept akin to the
political dualisms that prevailed in the West. There was no
Augustinian division between the city of God and the city of Man,
no medieval Catholic doctrine of two powers or two swords, no
Protestant understandings of two kingdoms or two realms and no
American understanding of a wall of separation between church
and state.9" After the fourth century, the prevailing Orthodox view
was that church and state are part of an organic religious and
political community, bonded by blood, soil, and confession.99
To be sure, this symbiosis of church and state subjected the
Orthodox Church to substantial state control over its polities and
properties, and substantial restrictions on its religious ministry and
prophecy. This arrangement, however, also gave the Orthodox
clergy a strong and singular spiritual voice in civil society. It
allowed the clergy to teach the community through Orthodox
schools and monasteries, through Orthodox literature and
preaching, often supported by generous state patronage. It allowed
them to nurture the community through the power and pathos of
the Orthodox liturgy, icons, artwork, prayers, and music. It allowed
100
them to advise officials on the moral dimensions of positive law.
This symbiotic relationship between church and state worked
well enough when state authorities were themselves Orthodox, or
at least openly supportive of Orthodoxy. Such was the case for much
of the history of Russia and other parts of Central Eurasia before

97. ALEXANDERF.C.WEBSTER,THEPRICEOFPOPHECY:OODOXCHURCHESONPEACE,
FREEDOM, AND SEcuRIrrY 148 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting the Orthodox Congress).

98. On the development of these doctrines, see RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN
THOUGHT, supranote 26.
99. See SociL AN POLITICAL THOUGHT IN BYZANTIUM (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1961) (1957).
100. See Harold J. Berman, Freedom of Religion in Russia.. An Amicus Brief for the
Defendant, in PROSELYTSIM AND ORTHODoxY, supranote 4, at 265, 270-71.
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the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.101 This relationship did not work
well, however, when political authorities had no Orthodox
allegiances. Such was the case for most other Orthodox
communities after the fifteenth century." 2 With the Islamic
conquest of the Byzantine Empire in the 1450s and the expansion
of the Ottoman Empire thereafter, the Orthodox Church could no
longer readily depend upon the state for protection and support.
Often consigned to restricted millets, local Orthodox communities
turned to the increasingly stretched Patriarchate of Constantinople
for their principal support. After the great wars of nationalist
liberation in Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Balkans in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the depleted Patriarchate of
Constantinople finallybroke the church into autocephalous national
churches, which cooperated with local governments as best they
could. Many of these new Orthodox churches saw separation from
state control and state support as the safest policy, even if not the
best theology. Similarly, after the great emigrations of Orthodox
believers to North America at the turn of the twentieth century, the
transplanted autocephalous Orthodox communities were forced to
survive with little support from local state officials. Here, too,
separation of church and state became an expedient principle of
ecclesiastical living. Similarly, after the Bolshevik Revolution of
1917 and the gradual sovietization of Eastern Europe, the church
came to endorse the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of separation of
church and state, mostly out of a sheer need to survive. Although
individual theologians have sought to draw a new theology of
separatism from these disparate experiences of Orthodox churches,
no such systematic theory seems to have yet captured the field.
Today, the Orthodox Church's commitment to human rights and
democratic principles is being tested more severely than ever
before, particularly in Russia and parts of Eastern Europe. The
remarkable democratic revolution of the Soviet bloc in the past two
decades has brought not only new liberty to these long-closed
101. See Firuz Kazemzadeh, Reflections on Church and State in Russian History, in
PROSELYTISM AND ORTHODOXY, supra note 4, at 227, 227-38; Philip Walters, The Russian

Orthodox Church and Foreign Christianity:The Legacy of the Past, in PROSELYrISM AND
ORTHODOXY, supra note 4, at 31, 32-41.
102. For this paragraph, see Vigen Gurioan, Evangelism and Mission in the Orthodox
Tradition,in SHARING THE BOOK, supra note 20, at 23146.
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societies, but also new license. These societies now face moral
degradation, economic dislocation and human suffering of massive
proportions. They face the renewal of ancient animosities among
religious and cultural rivals previously kept at bay by the
Communist Party. They face an enormous influx of foreigners,
whether religious, cultural, or economic, that offer beliefs and
practices radically different from those held by either the fallen
socialist state or the struggling Orthodox churches.
The leadership of the Orthodox Church of late, while continuing
to endorse democratic and human rights principles, has bitterly
condemned the corrosive libertarian values that often accompany
these principles. Aleksii II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, put
the matter crisply in 1996:
Orthodox consciousness is currently being eroded away by
extreme liberalism, capable ofleadingto tragic consequences for
the Church-to schism, division in the church, the undermining
ofOrthodox beliefs and to ultimate destruction. We must stand
against this destructive process by our constancy in faith and
belief in the traditions and living Orthodox religious experience
of Christian love and concern for each individual believer and
for Russia as a whole."°
"[F]reedom does not mean general license," Patriarch Aleksii
pronounced a few months later.
The truth of Christ which sets us free (John 8:32) also places
upon us a great responsibility, to respect and preserve the
freedom of others. However, the aggressive imposition [on
Russia] ofviews and principles which come from a religious and
cultural environment which is strange to us, is in fact a
violation of both religious and civil rights. 4
Bartholomew, Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople,
has pressed this critique further, suggestingthat western Catholics
103. Address of the Patriarchto the Councils of the Moscow Parishesat the Episcopal

Gathering,12 December 1996, 6 TsEKOVNO-oBScHESTVENNYIVEsTNiK 7, col. 1.
104. The Report to the Bishops Council in Moscow, 18-23 February 1997, Section 11:
Interconfessional and inter-faith relations; participationin the activity of international
Christianorganizations,Pravoslavnaya Moskva (Mar. 1997), No. 7 (103), 4.
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and Protestants have become too beholden to Enlightenment
liberalism and too willing to propagate such views under the guise
of Christian theology. In a series of speeches to American audiences
in the fall of 1997, Bartholomew declared that western Christianity
has fallen under "the shadow of the Enlightenment." Orthodox
Christianity has not. The Enlightenment provides too little room for
faith and too much room for freedom.
Since the Enlightenment, the spiritual bedrock of Western
civilization has been eroded and undermined. Intelligent, well
intentioned people sincerely believed that the wonders of
science could replace the miracles of faith. But these great
minds missed one vital truth-that faith is not a garment to be
slipped on and off; it is a quality of the human spirit, from
which it is inseparable. 10 5
"There are a few things America [and the rest of the West] can
learn from the Orthodox Church," the Patriarch declared.0 6
Foremost is the lesson "that, paradoxically, faith can endure
without freedom, but freedom cannot long abide without faith."'
A balance must be struck between freedom and faith, as the
transplanted Orthodox churches of the West have only recently
come to realize.
Orthodox Christians, who live in a country where full religious
freedom reigns and where adherents of various religions live
side by side,... constantly see various ways of living and are in
danger of being beguiled by certain of them, without examining
if their way is consonant with the Orthodox Faith. Already,
many of the old and new Orthodox... are stressing different,
existing deviations from correct Orthodox lives.'
Where such a critical stand on human rights will lead the
Orthodox Church is very much an open question. Orthodoxy has a
strong, ancient foundation for an alternative Christian theology of
duty-based rights and rights-based social action that holds great
105. PROSELYTISM AND ORTHoDOxY, supra note 4, at 20.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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intellectual and institutional promise. Moreover, as James
Bilhington has brilliantly shown, the Orthodox Church has immense
spiritual resources, whose implications for human rights are only
now beginning to be seen." 9 These spiritual resources lie, in part,
in Orthodox worship-the passion of the liturgy, the pathos of the
icons, and the power of spiritual silence. They lie, in part, in
Orthodox churchlife-the distinct balancingbetweenhierarchy and
congregationalism through autocephaly; between uniform worship
and liturgical freedom through alternative vernacular rites;
between community and individuality through a trinitarian
communalism, which is centered on the parish, on the extended
family, on the wizened grandmother (the "babushka" in Russia).
These spiritual resources lie, in part, in the massive martyrdom of
millions of Orthodox faithful in the twentieth century-whether
suffered by Russian Orthodox under the Communist Party, by
Greek and Armenian Orthodox under Turkish and Iranian radicals,
by Middle Eastern Copts at the hands of religious extremists, or by
North African Orthodox under all manner of fascist autocrats. 1 0
These deep spiritual resources of the Orthodox Church have no
exact parallels in modern Catholicism and Protestantism. How the
Orthodox Church can apply them to the nurture of human rights is
one of the great challenges, and opportunities, of this new century.
At minimum, it would be wise for us Westerners to lay aside our
simple caricatures ofthe Orthodox Church as a politically corrupted
body that is too prone to clerical indiscipline, mystical idolatry, and
nominal piety to have much to offer to a human rights regime. A
church with more than 250 million members scattered throughout
the world defies such broad generalizations. It would be wise to
hear what an ancient church, newly charred and chastened by
decades of oppression and martyrdom, considers essential to the
regime of religious rights. It would be enlightening to watch how
ancient Orthodox communities, still largely centered on the parish
and the family, will reconstruct social and economic rights. It would
be prudent to see whether a culture, more prone to beautifying than
to analyzing, might transform our understanding of cultural rights.
109. See James H. Billington, Orthodox Christianityand theRussian Transformation,in
PROSELYTISM AND ORTHODOXY, supra note 4, at 51-65; James H. Biflington, The Case for
Orthodoxy, NEW REPUBLIC, May 30, 1994, at 24.

110. Billington, supra note 109, at 63.
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It would be instructive to listen to how a tradition that still
celebrates spiritual silence as its highest virtue might recast the
meaning of freedom of speech and expression. It would be
illuminating to feel how a people that have long cherished and
celebrated the role of the woman-the wizened babushka of the
home, the faithful remnant in the parish pews, the living icon ofthe
Assumption of the Mother of God-might elaborate the meaning of
women's rights.
IV. THE PROVINCE AND PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS TODAY
Thus far, I have pressed the twin theses that religion must have
a greater role in the cultivation of human rights and that human
rights must have a larger place in the calculations of religious
bodies. This greater interaction between religion and human rights,
I submit, will ultimately strengthen both the regime of human
rights and the protection of religious bodies. But this greater
interaction with religion will also challenge and complicate some of
the current formulations of religious rights. To illustrate this point,
permit me to sketch the broad outline of the province of religious
rights, as currently defined by international human rights
instruments, and then touch on a few of the most controversial
provisions that have increasingly beset this regime as religions
have become more actively involved.
A. The Basic Law
Three international instruments contain the most critical
protections of religious rights and liberties: (1) the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (the 1966
1 1 (2) the UnitedNationsDeclarationon the Elimination
Covenant);
ofAll FormsoflntoleranceandofDiscriminationBased on Religion
or Belief (1981) (the 1981 Declaration);1 12 and (3) the Concluding
111. G.& Res. 22004, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess.-(1966), reprintedin RELIGION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, supranote 8,at 69. [hereinafter ICCPR.
112. United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
DiscriminationBasedon Religion or Belief,G.A.Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No.
51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (1981), reprintedin RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 8,

at 102 [hereinafter 1981 Declaration].
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Documentofthe Vienna Follow-up Meeting ofRepresentativesof the
ParticipatingStatesof the Conferenceon Security and Co-operation
was promulgated in 1989 (the Vienna Concluding
in Europe that
3
Document).1

1. 1966 Covenant
The 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights repeats the
capacious guarantee of religious rights and liberties first announced
in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 18
reads:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have

or to adopt a religion or belief ofhis choice, and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or beliefinworship, observance,
practice and teaching.

2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable,
legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of
their children in conformity with their own convictions." 4
Article 18 distinguishes between the right to freedom of religion
and the freedom to manifest one's religion-the analogies to the
American-law concepts of liberty of conscience and free exercise of
religion, respectively. The right to freedom of religion-the freedom
to have, to alter, or to adopt a religion of one's choice-is an
absolute right from which no derogation may be made and which
113. Concluding Document ofthe Vienna Meeting ofRepresentatives ofthe Participating
States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [selections], 28 I.L.M. 527
(1989), reprintedin RELIGION AND HUMANRIGBTS, supranote 8, at 154 [hereinafter Vienna
Concluding Document].
114. ICCPR art. 18, supranote 111, at 74.
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may not be restricted or impaired in any manner. Freedom to
manifest or exercise one's religion-individually or collectively,
publicly or privately-may be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
The latter provision is an exhaustive list of the grounds allowed to
limit the manifestation of religion. Legislatures may not limit the
manifestation of religion on any other grounds." 5
The requirement of necessity implies that any such limitation on
the manifestation of religion must be proportionate to its aim to
protect one or more of these specific state interests. Such limitation
must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights
guaranteed in Article 18. In American constitutional law terms,
Article 18 upholds the requirement that, to pass muster, a law
burdening the exercise of religion must be in service of a compelling
state interest and use the least restrictive a means to achieve that
16
interest.1
Articles 2 and 26 of the 1966 Covenant require equal treatment
of all persons before the law and prohibit discrimination based on
religion. According to international case law, unequal treatment of
equal cases is allowed only if that treatment serves an objective and
reasonable purpose and the inequality is proportionate to that
purpose."i 7
The Human Rights Committee, established under the 1966
Covenant, has made it explicit in its General Comment No. 22(48)
concerning Article 18 that:
115. See United Nations Human Rights Committee GeneralComment No. 22, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.4 (1993), reprintedin RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 8, at

92, 93-94 [hereinafter Comment 48(2)].
116. See Alexandre

Charles Kiss, Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE

INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, 290, 305-08

(Louis Henkin ed., 1981) [hereinafter

INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS]; Natan Lerner, ReligiousHuman Rights Under the United
Nations, in RELIGIOUS HumAN RIGHTS II, supra note *, at 79, 91-93; Karl Josef Partsch,
Freedomof ConscienceandExpression,andPoliticalFreedoms,in THE INTRNATioNALBiLL
OF RIGHTS, supra, at 209, 210-12.
117. For analysis of the international case law, particularly from the European
Community, see T. Jeremy Gunn, Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European
Conventionon Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS II, supra note *, at 305, 305-30
[hereinafter Gunn, AdjudicatingRights]; LERNER, supra note 8, at 40-50; T. Jeremy Gunn,
Caesar'sSword: The 1997 Law ofthe Russian Federationon the Freedom of Conscience and
ReligiousAssociations, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 43, 67 (1998).
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The terms belief and religion are to be broadly construed.
Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions
or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or
practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The
Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to
discriminate against any religion or belief for any reasons,
including the fact that they are newly established, or represent
religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility by a
predominant religious community." 8
In this same General Comment, the Human Rights Committee
has further clarified that the freedom to manifest one's religion
includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their
basic affairs, such as the freedom to choose their religious leaders,
priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or
religious schools, and the freedom to prepare and distribute
religious texts or publications."
2. 1981 Declaration
The 1981 Declaration elaborated what the 1966 Covenant
adumbrated. The Declaration includes (1) prescriptions of religious
rights for individuals and groups; (2) proscriptions on religious
discrimination, intolerance, or abuse; (3) provisions specific to the
religious rights of parents and children; and (4) explicit principles
ofimplementation.'2 Like the 1966 Covenant, the 1981 Declaration
on its face applies to "everyone," whether "individually or in
community," "in public or private. " "2
Articles 1 and 6 of the 1981 Declaration set forth a lengthy
illustrative catalogue of rights to "freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion"-illustrating more concretely the ambit of what
American law calls "liberty of conscience" and "free exercise of
religion."" Such rights include the right:

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Comment 48(2), item 2, supranote 115, at 92.
See id item 4, at 92-93.
See 1981 Declaration, supranote 112, at 102-04.
Id art. 1.1, at 103.
Id. at 103-04.
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(a) To worship or assemble in connexion with a religion or
belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or
humanitarian institutions;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the
necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs
of a religion or belief;
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in
these areas;
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these
purposes;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other
contributions from individuals and institutions;
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession
appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and
standards of any religion or belief;
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and
ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one's religion or

belief;
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals
and communities in matters of religion and belief at the
national and international levels.'2
Like the 1966 Covenant, the 1981 Declaration allows the
"manifestation of religion" to be subjected to "appropriate" state
regulation and adjudication.124 The 1981 Declaration permits states
to enforce against religious individuals and institutions general
regulations designed to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.' It is
assumed, however, that in all such instances the grounds for such
regulation are enumerated and explicit and that such regulations
abide by the international legal principles of proportionality,
necessity, and nondiscrimination. 6
The 1981 Declaration includes more elaborate provisions
concerning the religious rights of children and their parents."7 It
123. Id. art. 6, at 104.
124. See id. art. 1, at 103.
125. See id.
126. See id. art. IV, at 103; see also LERNER, supranote 8, at 15-32 (providing a detailed
analysis ofthe 1966 Covenant and the 1981 Declaration).
127. See 1981 Declaration art. 5, supranote 112, at 83.
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guarantees the right of parents (or guardians) to organize life
within the household and to educate their children in accordance
with their religion or beliefs. Such parental responsibility, however,
must be discharged in accordance with the "best interests of the
At minimum, the parents' religious upbringing or
child."'
education "must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or
to his full development." 9 Although the drafters debated at length
the potential conflicts between the parent's right to rear and
educate their children in accordance with their religion and the
state's power to protect the best interests of the child, they offered
no specific principles to resolve these disputes.
The 1981 Declaration includes suggested principles of
implementation and application of these guarantees. It urges states
to take all "effective measures to prevent and eliminate
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in the
recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social
and cultural life."'3 0 It urges states to remove local laws that
perpetuate or allow religious discrimination and to enact local
criminal and civil laws to combat religious discrimination and

intolerance. 131
The 1981 Declaration, though not a binding legal instrument,
provides a principled reference for monitoring a nation's compliance
with international standards of religious liberty. It sets a baseline
for guiding diplomatic relations and treaties among nation-states.
It provides a common ground for nongovernmental and
intergovernmental organizations to report and register complaints
of religious rights violations. It also charges the United Nations
Special Rapporteur, appointed by the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights, to provide a general survey and specific onsite
evaluations of Member States of the United Nations. The United
States was among the States under evaluation in 1998."32

128. Id
129. Id. art. 5.5, at 104.
130. Id. art. 4.1, at 103.
131. See id. art. 4.2, at 103.
132. See Abdelfattah Amor, The Mandateof the UNSpecial Rapporteur,12 EMORY INT'L
L. REV.945, 947-50 (1998).
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3. 1989 Vienna ConcludingDocument
The 1989 Vienna Concluding Document, which applies to the
participating states in the OSCE, extends these norms, particularly
for religious groups. Principles 16 and 17 provide a clear distillation
of principles that is worth quoting in full:
16. In order to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess
and practice religion or belief the participating States will, inter
alia,
16a. take effective measures to prevent and eliminate
discrimination against individuals or communities, on the
grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all
fields of civil, political, economic, social and cultural life, and
ensure the effective equality between believers and nonbelievers;
16b. foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between
believers of different communities as well as between believers
and non-believers;
16c. grant upon their request to communities of believers,
practising or prepared to practise their faith within the
constitutional framework of their states, recognition of the
status provided for them in their respective countries;
16d. respect the right of religious communities to -- establish
and maintain freely accessible places of worship or
assembly,--organize themselves according to their own
hierarchical and institutional structure,-select, appoint and
replace their personnel in accordance with their respective
requirements and standards as well as with any freely accepted
arrangement between them and their State-solicit and receive
voluntary financial and other contributions;
16e. engage in consultations with religious faiths, institutions
and organizations in order to achieve a better understanding of
the requirements of religious freedom;
16f. respect the right of everyone to give and receive religious
education in the language of his choice, individually or in
association with others;
16g. in this context respect, inter alia, the liberty of parents to
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in
conformity with their own convictions;
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16h. allow the training of religious personnel in appropriate
institutions;
16i. respect the right of individual believers and communities of
believers to acquire, possess, and use sacred books, religious
publications in the language of their choice and other articles
and materials related to the practice of religion or belief;
16j. allow religious faiths, institutions and organizations to
produce and import and disseminate religious publications and
materials;
16k. favorably consider the interest of religious communities in
participating in public dialogue, interalia,through mass media;
17. The participating States recognize that the exercise of the
above-mentioned rights relating to the freedom of religion or
belief may be subject only to such limitations as are provided by
law and consistent with their obligations under international
law and with their international commitments. They will
ensure in their laws and regulations and in their application the
of the freedom of thought,
full and effective implementation
33
conscience, religion or belief.1
These are the basic international provisions on religious rights on
the books. Regional instruments, notably the EuropeanConvention
for the Protection of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms
(1950), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), and the
African Charteron Human and People's Rights (1981), elaborate
some of these guarantees."3 4 International treaties involving
religious bodies, such as the recent Concordats between the Vatican
and Italy, Spain and Israel, as well as the Universal Islamic
DeclarationofHuman Rights (1981), and the CairoDeclarationon
Human Rights in Islam (1990), give particular accent to the
religious concerns and constructions of their cosigners.' The three
main instruments, summarized above, however, capture the
common lore of current international human rights norms on
religious rights and liberties.

133. Vienna Concluding Document, arts. 16 & 17, supranote 113, at 155-56.

134. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative
Framework,in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS II, supranote *, at 1, 25-33; EVANS, supranote 8,

at 262; Gunn, AdjudicatingRights, supranote 117, at 305, 308.
135. These documents are contained in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at
185-89.
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B. The New Problems
1. DelimitingReligion
The most difficult, and most ironic, problem is that the more
religion is included in the regime of human rights, the more
important it will be to set limits to the regime of religious rights. If
religion is to be assigned a special place in the human rights
pantheon-if religion is in need of special protections and privileges
not afforded by other rights provisions-some means of
distinguishing religious rights claims from all others must be
offered. Fairness commands as broad a definition as possible, so
that no legitimate religious claim is excluded. Prudence counsels a
narrower definition, so that not every claim becomes religious and,
thus, no claim becomes deserving of special religious rights
protection. To define "religion" too closely is to place too much trust
in the capacity of the lexicon or the legislature. To leave the term
undefined is to place too much faith in the self-declarations of the
claimant or the discernment of local judges and administrators.
International human rights instruments provide very broad
definitions of "religion." Article 18 of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights makes a sweeping guarantee:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance."" 6 The Declaration's conflation
of the terms "religion," "thought," "conscience" and "belief'
continues in subsequent instruments-most notably in the 1966
Covenant and the 1981 Declaration."' The Declaration's recognition
of religion as individual and communal, internal and external,
private and public, permanent and transient, likewise persists.
The capacious definition of religion at international law has left
it largely to individual states and individual claimants to define the
boundaries of the regime of religious rights. 8' No common
136. ICCPR art. 18, supra note 111, at 59.
137. See 1981 Declaration art. 1.1, supra note 112, at 103.
138. See Dinah Shelton & Alexandre Kiss, A Draft Model Law on Freedom of Religion,
with Commentary, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS II, supranote *,at 559, 568-72.
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definition or uniform method has been forthcoming. Indeed, the
statutes, cases and regulations of many countries embrace a
bewildering array of definitions of "religion," which neither local
officials nor legal commentators have been able to integrate. Some
courts and legislatures make a simple "common sense" inquiry as
to the existence of religion. Others defer to the good faith selfdeclarations of religion by the claimant. Others seek to find
sufficient analogies between existing religions and new religious
claimants. Others insist on evidence of a god or something
transcendent, that stands in the same position as a god. And yet
others analyze the motives for formation of the religious
organization or adoption of a religious belief, the presence and
sophistication of a set of doctrines explicating the beliefs, the
practice and celebration of religious rites and liturgies, the degree
of formal training required for the religious leaders, the strictures
on the ability of members to practice other religions, the presence
and internal enforcement of a set of ethical rules of conduct, as well
as other factors. 9
These are not idle academic exercises in religious taxonomy. The
answer to the threshold legal question of "What is religion?"
determines whether a particular claim or claimant, person or group,
is entitled to a range of special rights and liberties that are reserved
for religion alone. It is a question of particular importance to newlyarrived religious minorities (such as Santerians or Scientologists),
to growing breakaway faiths (such as the Bah'ais, the Ahmadis, or
the Mormons), or to the many traditional religions and new sects
that are emerging throughout the world.
In my view, the functional and institutional dimensions of
religion deserve the strongest emphasis in defining the boundaries
of religious rights. Of course, religion viewed in its broadest terms
embraces all beliefs and actions that concern the ultimate origin,
meaning, and purpose of life, of existence. It involves the responses
of the human heart, soul, mind, conscience, intuition, and/or reason
to revelation, to transcendent values, to fundamental questions. But
such wide definitions of religion applied at law would render
everything (and thus nothing) deserving of religious rights
139. For recent international efforts, see id at 569; Haim H. Cohn, Religious Human
Rights, 19 DineIsrael:An Annual ofJewishLaw PastandPresent 101-26, at 102-09 (1998).
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protection. Viewed in a narrower, institutional sense, religion
embraces, what Leonard Swidler calls, a creed, a cult, a code of
conduct, and a confessional community."4 A creed defines the
accepted cadre of beliefs and values concerning the ultimate origin,
meaning, and purpose oflife. A cult defines the appropriate rituals,
liturgies, and patterns of worship and devotion that give expression
to those beliefs. A code of conduct defines the appropriate individual
and social habits of those who profess the creed and practice the
cult. A confessional community defines the group of individuals who
embrace and live out this creed, cult, and code of conduct, both on
their own and with fellow believers.' By this definition, a religion
can be traditional or very new, closely confining or loosely
structured, world-avertive or world-affirmative. Religious claims
and claimants that meet this definition, in my view, deserve the
closest religious rights consideration.
This is also part of the reason that I stand by the phrase
"religious (human) rights" despite the well-meaning and well-taken
criticisms of some that this term is idiosyncratic and too
restrictive.'4 2 It must be said that the phrase "religious rights" is
not my idiosyncratic invention. It is a rather common traditional
term-used in Europe since the fifteenth century, and in America
since the seventeenth century-to describe the body of special
liberties, entitlements, immunities, and exemptions that a person
or a group can claim on the basis of religion alone. These liberties
go beyond the generic freedoms of speech, press, or assembly and
the general guarantees of equal protection and due process of law. "
To be sure, it was unduly churlish in earlier centuries to restrict
140. See LeonardSwidlerIntroductiontoHumanRights andReligiousLiberty-Fromthe
Past to the Future,in RELIGIOUS LIBERTYAND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONS AND IN RELIGIONS
vii (Leonard Swidler ed., 1986).
141. See id. The former UN Special Rapporteur, Elizabeth Odio-Benito, has written
similarly that religion is "an explanation'of the meaning of life and how to live accordingly.
Every religion has at least a creed, a code of action, and a cult." U.N. Doc. EfCN.41
Sub.211987/26 (1987), at 4.
142. See David Little, Studying "ReligiousHumanRights": MethodologicalFoundations,
in RELIGIOUS HUmAN RIGHTS II, supra note *, at 49-52; Malcolm D. Evans, Book Review 46
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 728 (1997) (reviewing RELIGIOUS HuMAN RIGHTS I & II); David Little,
Religion andHumanRights: A Review Essay on Religion, Relativism,and OtherMatters,27
J. RELIGIOUS ETmICs 151, 154 n.1. (1999).
143. ForEuropean sources, see Karl Schwarz,DerBegriffExercitiumReligionisPrivatum,
105 ZErrSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIOTUNG (Kan. Ab.) 495 (1988).
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these claims only to members of one established religion. Many
legitimate religious claims and claimants were thereby foreclosed
from legal recourse in state courts."" But it is unduly charitable
today to allow religious claims to be predicated on the almost
boundless basis of thought, conscience, or belief. Many legitimate
claims of thought, conscience, or belief that are not "religious," as
defined above, are amply protected by other rights norms.
Claimants should be encouraged to seek their legal recourse there,
rather than allowed to stretch the pale of religious rights ever more
widely to cover themselves. In the abstract, this may sound elitist
and traditionalist. But, unless some clear limit is assigned to the
ambit of, and the access to, the regime of religious rights, such
rights will be in danger ofbecoming open to everyone, but protective
of nothing.
Religion is special: it has been, and must continue to be, accorded
special protection in a human rights regime. Religion is more than
simply another form of speech and assembly, privacy, and
autonomy. It requires more than simply the freedoms of speech and
assembly, equality and nondiscrimation to be effectively protected.
Religion is a unique source of individual and personal identity and
activity, involving "duties that we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging them," as James Madison once put it.'
Religion is also a unique form of public and social identity, involving
a vast plurality of sanctuaries, schools, charities, missions, and
other forms and forums of faith. Both individual and corporate,
private and public entities and exercises of religion-in all their
self-defined varieties--deserve the protection of a human rights
regime. Generic human rights guarantees are not protective
enough. Even generously defined, freedom of speech cannot protect
many forms ofindividual and corporate religious exercise-from the
silent meditations of the sages to the noisy pilgrimages of the
saints, from the corporate consecration of the sanctuary, to the
ecclesiastical discipline ofthe clergy. Even expansively interpreted,
guarantees of equality cannot protect the special needs of religious
individuals and religious groups to be exempted from certain state
144. See, e.g., Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: A HistoricalPerspective, in RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT, supranote 26, at 29.

145. James Madison, Memorialand RemonstranceagainstReligiousAssessments (1785),
in 8 TEE PAPERS OF JAmES MADISON 298, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
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prescriptions or proscriptions that run afoul of the core claims of
conscience, or the central commandments of the faith. Hence, the
necessity for a special category and concept called religious rights.
2. The Problemof Conversion
A second human rights problem that has been exacerbated by the
greater inclusion of religion concerns the right to change one's
religion.' How does one craft a legal rule that at once respects and
protects the sharply competing understandings of conversion among
the religions of the Book? Most western Christians have easy
conversion into and out of the faith. Most Jews have difficult
conversion into and out of the faith. Most Muslims have easy
conversion into the faith, but allow for no conversion out of it." 7
Whose rites get rights? Moreover, how does one craft a legal rule
that respects Orthodox, Hindu, Jewish, or traditional groups that
tie religious identity not to voluntary choice, but to birth and caste,
blood and soil, language and ethnicity, sites and sights of
148
divinity?
International human rights instruments initially masked over
these conflicts, despite the objections of some Muslim delegations.
The 1948 Universal Declaration included an unequivocal guarantee:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
.. . .149 The 1966 Covenant, whose preparation was more highly
contested on this issue, became more tentative: "This right shall
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice

146. See NatanLernerProselytism,ChangeofReligion, andInternationalHumanRights,
12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 477 (1998), updated in LERNER, supra note 8, at 80-118; see also
EVANS, supra note 9, at 201-02, 221-22; J.A. Walkate, The Right ofEveryone to ChangeHis
Religion or Belief, 30 NETHERLANDS INTL L. REV. 146 (1983).
147. See Donna E. Arzt, The Treatment of Religious Dissidents Under Classical and
Contemporary Islamic Law, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS I, supra note *, at 387, 406-08;
David Novak, Proselytism in Judaism,in SHARING THE BOOK, supranote 20, at 17, 17-44;
Joel A. Nichols, Mission,Evangelism, andProselytismin Christianity:MainlineConceptions
as Reflected in Church Documents, 12 EMORY INTL L. REV. 563, 563-64 (1998).
148. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in
ARTICLES oFFATH, ARTICLES OFPEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTYCLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN

PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 74 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
149. 1948 Universal Declaration art. 18, supranote 28, at 59.
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. ... ."' The 1981 Declaration repeated this same more tentative
language. The dispute over the right to conversion, however,
contributed greatly to the long delay in the production of this
instrument, and to the number of dissenters to it.' 5 ' The 1989
Vienna Concluding Document did not touch the issue at all, but
simply confirmed "the freedom of the individual to profess and
practice religion or belief" before turning to a robust rendition of
religious group rights.'52 Today, the issue has become more divisive
than ever as various soul wars have broken out between and within
Christian and Muslim communities around the globe.
"A page of history is worth a volume of logic," Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said. 53 And, on an intractable legal issue such as
this, recollection might be more illuminating than ratiocination.
It is discomforting, but enlightening, for western Christians to
remember that the right to enter and exit the religion of one's
choice was born in the West only after centuries of cruel experience.
To be sure, a number of the early Church Fathers considered the
right to change religion an essential element of the notion of liberty
of conscience. Such sentiments have been repeated and glossed
continuously until today.' In practice, though, the Christian
Church largely ignored these sentiments for centuries. As the
medieval church refined its rights structures in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, it also routinized its religious discrimination,
reserving its harshest sanctions for heretics. The communicant
faithful enjoyed full rights. Jews and Muslims enjoyed fewer rights,
but full rights if they converted to Christianity. Heretics-those
who voluntarily chose to leave the faith-enjoyed still fewer rights
and had little opportunity to recover them, even after full
confession. Indeed, in the heyday of the inquisition, heretics faced
not only severe restrictions on their persons, properties, and
professions, but also sometimes unspeakably cruel forms of torture
and punishment.' Similarly, as the Lutheran, Calvinist, and
Anglican Churches routinized their establishments in the sixteenth
150. ICCPR art. 18.1, supranote 111, at 74.
151. See 1981 Declaration art. 1.1, supra note 112, at 103.
152. Vienna Concluding Document, Principle 16, supra note 113, at 155.
153. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,349 (1921).

154. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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and seventeenth centuries, they inflicted all manner of repressive
civil and ecclesiastical censures on those who chose to deviate from
established doctrine, including savage torture and execution in a
number of instances.'56
It was, in part, the recovery and elaboration of earlier patristic
concepts of liberty of conscience, as well as the slow expansion of
new Protestant theologies of religious voluntarism, that helped to
end this practice. It was also the new possibilities created by the
frontier and by the colonies, however, that helped to forge the
western understanding of the right to change religion. Rather than
stay at home and fight for one's faith, it became easier for the
dissenter to move away quietly to the frontier, or later to the
colonies, to be alone with his conscience and his co-religionists.
Rather than tie the heretic to the rack or the stake, it became easier
for the establishment to banish him quickly from the community
with a strict order not to return. Such pragmatic tempering of the
treatment of heretics and dissenters eventually found theological
justification. By the late sixteenth century, it became common in
the west to read of the right, and the duty, of the religious dissenter
to emigrate physically from the community whose faith he or she no
longer shared.' In the course of the next century, this right of
physical emigration from a religious community was slowly
transformed into a general right of voluntary exit from a religious
faith. American writers in particular, many of whom had voluntarily left their European faiths and territories to gain their
freedom, embraced the right to leave-to change their faith, to
abandon their blood, soil, and confession, to reestablish their lives,
beliefs, and identities afresh-as a veritable sine qua non of
religious freedom.'58 This understanding of the right to choose and
change religion-patristic, pragmatic, and Protestant in initial
inspiration-has now become an almost universal feature of
western understandings of religious rights.
156. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.

157. The most famous formulation of the right (and duty) of the dissenter to emigrate
peaceably from the territory whose religious establishment he or she cannot abide, came in
the Peace ofAugsburg (1555), and its provisions are repeated in the Edict of Nantes (1598),
and the Religious Peace of Westphalia (1648). See CHuRCHAND STATE, supranote 61, at 16498.
158. See Stackhouse and Hainsworth, Decidingfor God: TheRight to Convertin Protestant
Perspectives, in SHARING THE BOOK, supranote 83, at 86-100.

20011

A DICKENSIAN ERA OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS

761

To tell this peculiar western tale is not to resolve current legal

conflicts over conversion. Rather, it is to suggest that even hard and
hardened religious traditions can and do change over time, in part
out of pragmatism, in part out of fresh appeals to ancient principles
long forgotten. Even those schools of jurisprudence within Shi'ite
and Sunni communities that have been the sternest in their
opposition to a right of conversion from the faith have resources in
the Qur'an, the early development of Shari'a, and in the more
benign policies of other contemporary Muslim communities, to
rethink their theological positions.159
Moreover, the western story suggests that there are halfway
measures, at least in banishment and emigration, that help to blunt
the worst tensions between a religious group's right to maintain its
standards of entrance and exit and an individual's liberty of
conscience to come and go. Not every heretic needs to be executed.
Not every heretic needs to be indulged. It is one thing for a religious
tradition to insist on executing its charges of heresy, when a mature
adult, fully aware of the consequences of his or her choice, voluntarily enters a faith, and then later seeks to leave. In that
instance, group religious rights must trump individual religious
rights, with the limitation that the religious group has no right to
violate, or to solicit violation of, the life and limb of the wayward
member. It is quite another thing for a religious tradition to press
the same charges of heresy against someone who was born into,
married into, or coerced into the faith and now, upon opportunity
for mature reflection, voluntarily chooses to leave. In that case,
individual religious rights trump group religious rights.
Where a religious group exercises its trump by banishment or
shunning and the apostate voluntarily chooses to return, he does so
at his peril. He should find little protection in state law when
subject to harsh religious sanctions, unless the religious group
threatens or violates his life or limb. Where a religious individual
exercises her trump by emigration, and the group chooses to pursue
her, it does so at its peril. It should find little protection from state
159. See DonnaE. Arzt, JihadforHeartsandMinds: Proselytizingin the Qur'anandFirst
Three CenturiesofIslam, in SHARINGTHE BOOK, supranote 20, at 79,85-94; Arzt, supranote
147, at 108; Esack, supra note 48; Richard C. Martin, Conversion to Islam by Invitation:
Proselytismand the Negotiation ofIdentity in Islam, in SHARING THE BOOK, supra note 20,
at 95, 95-117.
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law when charged with tortious or criminal violations of the
individual.
There are numerous analogous tensions-generally with lower
stakes-between the religious rights claims of a group and its
individual members. These will become more acute as religion and
human rights become more entangled. Particularly volatile will be
tensions over discrimination against women and children within
religious groups; enforcement of traditional religious laws of
marriage, family, and sexuality in defiance of state domestic laws;
maintenance of religious property, contract, and inheritance norms
that defy state private laws. On such issues, the current categorical
formulations of both religious group rights and religious individual
rights simply restate the problems, rather than resolve them. It will
take new arguments from history and experience and new appeals
to internal religious principles and practices, along the lines just
illustrated, to blunt, if not resolve, these tensions.
3. The Problem of Proselytism
The corollary to the modern problem of conversion is the modern
problem of proselytism-of the efforts taken by individuals or
groups to seek the conversion of another. How does the state
balance one person's or community's right to exercise and expand
its faith versus another person's or community's right to be left
alone to its own traditions? How does the state protect the
juxtaposed rights claims of majority and minority religions, or of
foreign and indigenous religions? These are not new questions.
They confronted the drafters of the international bill of rights from
the very beginning. On this issue, the international
instruments
160
provide somewhat more nuanced direction.
Article 18 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights protects a person's "freedom, either individually or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
" 16 1
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
But the same Article allows such manifestation of religion to be
160. See LERNER, supra note 8, at 80-118; Tad Stahnke, Proselytismand the Freedom to
Change Religion in InternationalHuman Rights Law, 1999 BYUL. REV. 251.
161. ICCPR art. 18.1, supra note 111, at 74 (emphasis added).
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subject to limitations that "are prescribed bylaw and are necessary
to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others."1 62 It prohibits outright any
"coercion" that would impair another's right "to have or to adopt a
religion or belief of his [or her] choice."1 6 It also requires state
parties and individuals to have "respect for the liberty of parents
...to ensure the religious and moral education of their children
in conformity with [the parents'] convictions-a provision underscored and amplified in more recent instruments and cases on
the rights of parents and children.' 64
Similarly, Article 19 of the 1966 Covenant protects the "freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice."165 Article 19,
however, also allows legal restrictions that are necessary for
"respect of the rights or reputations of others; for the protection of
national security or of public order (ordrepublic),or of public health
or morals." 6 6 As a further limitation on the rights of religion and
religious expression guaranteed in Articles 18 and 19, Article 26 of
the 1966 Covenant prohibits any discrimination on grounds of
religion. Furthermore, Article 27 guarantees to religious minorities
own culture" and "to profess and practice
the right "to enjoy their
1 67
their own religion."
The literal language of the mandatory 1966 Covenant (and its
amplification in more recent instruments and cases) certainly
protects the general right to proselytize-understood as the right to
"manifest," "teach," "express," and "impart" religious ideas for the
sake, among other things, of seeking the conversion of another. The
Covenant provides no protection for coercive proselytism; at
minimum this bars physical or material manipulation of the wouldbe convert and, in some contexts, even more subtle forms of
162. Id. art. 18.3.
163. Id. art. 18.2.
164. Id. art. 18.4; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20,1989,28 I.L.M.
1448, reprintedin RELIGIONAND HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 8, at 128.
165. ICCPR art. 19.2, supra note 111, at 74 (emphasis added).
166. Id. art. 19.3.
167. Id. art. 27, at 75; see alsoDeclarationon the Rights ofPersonsBelongingto National
orEthnc,Religious,andLinguisticMinorities,U.N. GAOR 135, Article 2.1 (1992), reprinted
in LERNER, supranote 8, at 140.
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deception, enticement, and inducement to convert. The Covenant
also casts serious suspicion on any proselytism among children, or
among adherents to minority religions. Outside of these contexts,
however, the religious expression inherent in proselytism is no
more suspect than political, economic, artistic, or other forms of
expression and should have, at minimum, the same rights.
Such rights to religion and religious expression, of course, are not
absolute. The 1966 Covenant and its progeny allow for legal
protections of "public safety, order, health, or morals," "national
security," and "the rights and reputation of others," particularly
minors and minorities. All such legal restrictions on religious
expression, however, must always be imposed without discrimination against any religion and with due regard for the general
mandates of "necessity and proportionality." General "time, place,
and manner" restrictions on all proselytizers, applied without
discrimination against any religion, might well be apt. Categorical
criminal bans on proselytism, however, or patently discriminatory
licensing or registration provisions are prima facie a violation of the
religious rights of the proselytizer-as has been clear in the United
States since Cantwell v. Connecticut6 ' and in the European
community since Kokkinakis v. Greece.6 9
To my mind, the preferred solution to the modern problem of
proselytism is not so much further state restriction as further selfrestraint on the part of both local and foreign religious groups.
Again, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides some useful cues.
Article 27 of the Covenant reminds us of the special right of local
religious groups, particularly minorities, "to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion."170 Such language
might well empower and encourage vulnerable minority traditions
to seek protection from aggressive and insensitive proselytism by
missionary mavericks and "drive-by" crusaders who have emerged
with alacrity in the past two decades. It might even have supported
a moratorium on proselytism for a few years in places like Russia
so that local religions, even the majority Russian Orthodox Church,
168. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
169. 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18 (1993). For a detailed analysis, see Gunn,
Adjudicating Rights, supra note 117, at 305-30.
170. ICCPR art. 27, supra note 111, at 75.
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had some time to recover from nearly a century of harsh oppression
that destroyed most of its clergy, seminaries, monasteries,
literature, and icons. But Article 27 cannot permanently insulate
local religious groups from interaction with other religions. No
religious and cultural tradition can remain frozen. For local
traditions to seek blanket protections against foreign proselytism,
even while inevitably interacting with other dimensions of foreign
cultures, is ultimately a self-defeating policy. It stands in sharp
contrast to cardinal human rights principles of openness,
development, and choice. Even more, it belies the very meaning of
being a religious tradition. As Jaroslav Pelikan reminds us:
"Tradition is the living
faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead
faith of the living."171
Article 19 of the Covenant reminds us further that the right to
expression, including religious expression, carries with it "special
duties and responsibilities." 172 One such duty, it would seem, is to
respect the religious dignity and autonomy of the other, and to
expect the same respect for one's own dignity and autonomy. This
is the heart of the Golden Rule. It encourages all parties, especially
foreign proselytizing groups, to negotiate and adopt voluntary codes
of conduct, restraint, and respect of the other. This requires not
only continued cultivation of interreligious dialogue and
cooperation-the happy hallmarks of the modern. ecumenical
movement and ofthe growing emphasis on comparative religion and
globalization in our seminaries. It also requires guidelines of
prudence and restraint that every foreign mission board would do
well to adopt and enforce: Proselytizers would do well to know and
appreciate the history, culture, and language of the proselytizee; to
avoid westernization of the Gospel and first amendmentization of
politics; to deal honestly and respectfully with theological and
liturgical differences; to respect and advocate the religious rights of
all peoples; to be Good Samaritans as much as good preachers; to
proclaim their Gospel both in word and in deed.' 73 Moratoria on
171. JAROSLAv PEmKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITIoN 65 (1984).

172. ICCPR art. 19.3, supranote 111, at 74.
173. See Anita Deyneka, GuidelinesforForeignMissionariesin the FormerSoviet Union,
in PROSELYMI5M AND ORTHODOXY, supra note 4, at 331, 332-33; SHARING THE BOOK, supra

note 20; Lawrence A. Uzzell, Guidelines for American Missionaries in Russia, in
PROSELYTISMAND ORTHODOXY, supranote 4, at 323-26, 329-30.
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proselytism might provide temporary relief; but moderation by
lroselytizers and proselytizees is the more enduring course.
4. Religion and State
A final human rights problem that will be exacerbated by the
greater inclusion of religion concerns is the relation of religion and
state government, or "church and state" as we say in the United
States. American writers, armed with the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, often emphasize that true religious liberty
requires the separation of church and state and the cessation of
state support for religion. Only the secular, or neutral, state can
guarantee religious liberty, it is argued, and only separation can
guarantee neutrality. Many Europeans, Africans, and Latin
Americans, for whom a disestablishment clause is largely foreign,
emphasize that religious liberty requires the material and moral
cooperation of religion and government. Indeed today, a number of
religious groups in the former Soviet bloc and sub-Saharan Africa
regard restitution and affirmative state action towards religion as
a necessary feature of any religious rights regime-if nothing else,
to undo and overcome past state repression of religion. Similarly,
some Catholic groups in Latin America urge cooperation of religious
and political bodies to preserve the "Catholicization" of public life
and culture. Some Islamic revivalists, from Algeria to Indonesia,
urge similar arrangements to enhance the "Islamicization" of the
community. Some Jewish groups argue similarly to protect the
Jewish character of the State of Israel. Such arguments have long
been used in the United Kingdom and Scandinavia to defend their
ancient religious establishments. 174 To cooperate or to separate, to
aid or to avoid one another, is a fundamental question that will
confront religions and states around the world with increasing
urgency in this new century.
On this fundamental legal problem, categorical platitudes avail
us less than concrete experiences. American readers might be
surprised to learn that international human rights instruments do
not mandate the disestablishment of religion or the separation of
174. For the foregoing, see the country and region studies in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS
II, supra note *.
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church and state. They might be further surprised to learn that
American constitutional law today no longer mandates the kind of
strict separationism suggested by Jefferson's "wall of separation
between church and state." Today's American state is not the
distant, quiet sovereign of Jefferson's day, from whom separation
was both natural and easy. Today's state, whether for good or ill, is
an intensely active sovereign from whom complete separation is
nearly impossible. Few religious believers and bodies can now avoid
contact with the state's pervasive network of education, charity,
welfare, child care, health care, family, construction, zoning,
workplace, taxation, and other regulations. Both confrontation and
cooperation with the modem American welfare state are almost
inevitable for any religion. American constitutionallaw has moved,
chaotically but ineluctably, toward this reality. When a state's
regulation imposes too heavy a burden on a particular religion, the
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause provides a pathway to
relief. When a state's appropriation imparts too generous a benefit
to particular religions alone, the First Amendment Establishment
Clause provides a pathway to dissent. But when a general
government scheme provides religious groups and activities with
the same benefits afforded to all other eligible recipients, few
constitutional objections are now effective.
Again, this is not to suggest that the American constitutional
story of religious rights must now be writ large upon the world.
Rather, it is to suggest that a single law on the books can give rise
to a wide range of laws in action. Legal traditions do change over
time and across cultures. The notion that there is but one proper
application ofinternational religious rights norms-be it American,
European, or African-cannot be countenanced. We can afford an
ample "margin of appreciation" for local variations on international
human rights themes without succumbing to charges of
relativism.175

175. See Little, Studying "Religious Human Rights," supra note 142, at 52-55; van der
Vyver, supranote 21.
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FINAL REFLECTIONS
A number of distinguished commentators

have recently

encouraged the abandonment of the human rights paradigm
altogether-as a tried and tired experiment that is no longer
effective, a fictional faith whose folly has now been fully exposed. 7 6
Others have bolstered this claim with cultural critiques-that
human rights are instruments ofneocolonization that the West uses
to impose its values on the rest, even toxic compounds that are
exported abroad to breed cultural conflict, social instability,
religious warfare and, thus, dependence on the West. 7 Others have
added philosophical critiques-that rights talk is the wrong talk for
meaningful debate about deep questions of justice, peace, and the
common good.17 Still others have added theological critiques-that
the secular beliefs in individualism, rationalism, and contractarianism inherent in the human rights paradigm cannot be
squared with cardinal biblical beliefs in creation, redemption, and
covenant. 179

Such criticisms properly soften the overly-bright optimism of
some human rights advocates. They properly curb the modern
appetite for the limitless expansion and even monopolization of
human rights in the quest for toleration, peace, and security. They
also properly criticize the libertarian accents that still too often
dominate our rights talk today. Such criticisms do not, however,
support the conclusion that we must abandon the human rights
paradigm altogether-particularly when no viable alternative
global forum and no viable alternative universal faith is yet at
hand. Instead, these criticisms support the proposition that the
176. See, e.g., ALASDAmiRMCINTYRE, AFrERVIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 69-70 (2d
ed., 1984) ("T]he truth is plain: there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief
in witches and in unicorns .... Natural or human rights ... are fictions."). For a critical
analysis ofthese views, ofthose of Richard Rorty, Jean-Franois Lyotard, and others, see Max
L. Stackhouse & Stephen E. Healey, Religion and HumanRights:A TheologicalApologetic,
in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS I, supra note *, at 485.
177. For a critical discussion of this thesis, and its manifestations in recent debates about
the cultural and moral relativity of human rights, see Little, supra note 142.
178. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALKC THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLrTICAL

DISCOURSE (1991).
179. See Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, The Concept ofRights in ChristianMoralDiscourse,
in A PRESERVING GRACE, supra note 43, at 143; David M. Smolin, Church, State, and
InternationalHuman Rights:A TheologicalAppraisal,73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1515 (1998).
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religious sources and dimensions of human rights need to be more
robustly engaged and extended. Human rights norms are not a
transient libertarian invention, or an ornamental diplomatic
convention. Human rights norms have grown out of millenniumlong religious and cultural traditions. They have traditionally
provided a forum and focus for subtle and sophisticated
philosophical, theological and political reflections on the common
good and our common lives. And they have emerged today as part
of the common law of the emerging world order. We should abandon
these ancient principles and practices only with trepidation, only
with explanation, only with articulation of viable alternatives. To
use our tenured liberties to deconstruct human rights without
posing real global alternatives is to insult the genius and the
sacrifice of their many creators. For now, the human rights
paradigm must stand-if nothing else as the "null hypothesis." It
must be constantly challenged to improve. It should be discarded,
however, only on cogent proof of a better global norm and practice.
A number of other distinguished commentators have argued that
religion can have no place in a modern regime of human rights.
Religions might well have been the mothers of human rights in
earlier eras, perhaps even the midwives of the modern human
rights revolution. Religion has now, however, outlived its utility.
Indeed, the continued insistence of special roles and rights for
religion is precisely what has introduced the Dickensian paradoxes
that now befuddle us. Religion is, by its nature, too expansionistic
and monopolistic, too patriarchal and hierarchical, too antithetical
to the very ideals of pluralism, toleration, and equality inherent in
a human rights regime. Purge religion entirely, this argument
concludes, and the human rights paradigm will thrive.180
This argument proves too much to be practicable. In the course
of the twentieth century, religion defied the wistful assumptions of
the western academy that the spread of Enlightenment reason and
science would slowly eclipse the sense of the sacred and the
Religion defied the evil
sensibility of the superstitious.'
assumptions of Nazis, Fascists, and Communists alike that gulags
180. For a critical analysis of this "standard secularist account" of human rights, see Max
L. Stackhouse, The IntellectualCrisisof a GoodIdea, 26(2) J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 263 (1998).

181. See Martin E. Marty, ReligiousDimensionsofHumanRights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS I, supranote *, at 1-2.
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and death camps, iconoclasm and book burnings, propaganda and
mind controls would inevitably drive religion into extinction. Yet
another great awakening of religion is upon us-one now global in
its sweep.
It is undeniable that religion has been, and still is, a formidable
force for both political good and political evil, that it has fostered
both benevolence and belligerence, peace and pathos of untold
dimensions. But, the proper response to religious belligerence and
pathos cannot be to deny that religion exists, or to dismiss it to the
private sphere and sanctuary. The proper response is to castigate
the vices and to cultivate the virtues of religion, to confirm those
religious teachings and practices that are most conducive to human
rights, democracy, and rule of law."8 2
Religion is an ineradicable condition of human lives and human
communities. Religion will invariably figure in legal and political
life-however forcefully the community might seek to repress or
deny its value or validity, however cogently the academy might
logically bracket it from its political and legal calculus. Religion
must be dealt with, because it exists-perennially, profoundly,
pervasively-in every community. It must be drawn into a
constructive alliance with a regime of law, democracy, and human
rights.

182. See, e.g., APPLEBY, supranote 18.

